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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the investment behaviour of institutional investors in 
terms of their shareholdings in 2,938 companies listed on the Tokyo and Osaka Stock 
Exchanges at the end of June 2002. By doing so, we provide one of the first detailed 
empirical analyses of the involvement of institutional investors in the ownership structure of 
Japanese listed firms. At the same time, we compare this aspect of Japanese corporate 
governance with the shareholdings of banks in the same group of firms.  
Our results show that the equity investments of financial investors – institutional 
investors and banks – in Japanese listed companies at the end of June 2002 were 
predominantly in the high-tech manufacturing, traditional manufacturing and 
communications industries. All financial investors combined held more than 60% of the 
equity capital of the firms listed on the Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges, with banks 
being the largest group of these financial investors.  
Further analysis shows that on average most financial investors were minority 
shareholders, holding up to 3% of a firm’s total shares. Domestic financial investors tended 
to have higher levels of ownership than foreign institutions, and small and minority 
shareholdings were more common among foreign financial investors than among domestic 
banks and institutional investors. 
Finally, the average shareholdings of six large Japanese financial groups in 
Japanese listed companies were considerable, representing an average ownership level 
of 3.3% of a firm’s stock. However, they were not as high as to exert a significant degree of 
corporate control.  
All in all, we conclude that as of end-June 2002, banks continued to be important 
shareholders of Japanese listed firms, owing around 34% of the market capitalisation of all 
listed firms on the Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges. At the same time, institutional 
investors, predominantly investment firms and insurance companies, were important 
shareholders as well, accounting for around 27% of total market capitalisation. Moreover, 
we found that foreign investment funds were very important shareholders of Japanese 
listed firms, which confirms the general perception that foreign ownership of Japan’s 
corporate sector has become a rather crucial characteristic of the system of corporate 
governance in Japan. 
 
Keywords:  banks, corporate governance, institutional investors, Japan. 
JEL Classification: G21, G30, G34. 
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1 Introduction 
It will be clear to any regular reader of the economic and financial press that interest in 
corporate governance issues has increased significantly over the past years in most countries 
around the world. This seems to have been driven largely by two parallel developments.  
First, it has become increasingly evident, based on large numbers of both theoretical 
and empirical studies, that corporate governance mechanisms and their specific design and 
development may have important consequences for the growth potential of a country’s 
economic system and its relative competitiveness (see for example: Emmons and Schmid, 
1999; Carlin and Mayer, 2003; Morck et al., 2005). National differences in governance 
structures, both at the macro and micro level, may be responsible for differences in the 
development of financial structures, industries and firms across countries. 
Second, major crises and scandals that developed during the past decade 
highlighted the importance of sound corporate governance practices. The East Asian crisis 
that started in 1997 brought several countries at the brink of economic collapse and revealed 
serious shortcomings in their governance structures (Woo et al., 2000; Claessens and Fan, 
2002; OECD, 2003). This was more recently followed by accounting scandals and corporate 
failures involving some of the largest firms in the world, such as Enron and Worldcom in the 
US, the large retail agglomerate Ahold in the Netherlands and the global diary company 
Parmalat in Italy (Hopt, 2002; Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003; Healy and Palepu, 2003; 
Maddaloni and Pain, 2004; ECB, 2005).  
These developments have brought corporate governance to the full attention of both 
policymakers and researchers. As a result, there has been a surge in policy initiatives to 
strengthen corporate governance frameworks and in research output related to corporate 
governance issues (for the former see: ECB, 2005). Furthermore, in many countries so-called 
corporate governance codes have been introduced that advocate “best practices”, which are 
often voluntary and remain rather national oriented initiatives (European Commission, 2002). 
These developments have evidenced the existence of both important similarities and 
differences between governance practices across countries, and stimulated discussions on 
the perceived benefits and drawbacks of various corporate governance systems. 
In this discussion, Japan has been one of the most intensively debated countries. 
The conventional wisdom for many years has been that the Japanese system of corporate 
governance was “unique”, and that it contributed importantly to Japan’s post-war economic 
success story (Van Rixtel, 2002). However, the once “miracle” status of the Japanese 
economy disappeared rapidly in the course of the 1990s, when Japan experienced a major 
banking crisis and a prolonged economic recession, accompanied by a sharp increase in 
bankruptcies and financial scandals, which functioned as important catalysts for discussions 
about the adequacy of existing corporate governance systems and the need for reforms. The 
outcome of this process has been multi-facetted and has led to, among many other 
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initiatives, the establishment of an almost completely new legal framework and the adoption 
of a non-legally binding set of corporate governance principles that aimed at establishing 
sound corporate governance practices in Japan (Corporate Governance Forum of Japan, 
1999; Japan Corporate Governance Committee, 2001). All in all, at this juncture, consensus 
is building that important changes in the structure of corporate governance in Japan have 
been and are taking place (Patrick, 2004; Schulz, 2004; Schaede, 2006b). 
In the discussion on the evolving structure of Japanese corporate governance, 
increased attention is being paid to the role of institutional investors, such as insurance 
companies, investment firms and pension funds (Suto et al., 2005; Miyajima and Kuroki, 
2005; Schaede, 2006a). Anecdotal evidence is emerging that institutional investors may be 
engaging more actively in Japan in the governance of their investments. As a matter of fact, 
some observers have argued that Japan is moving towards a more market-based corporate 
governance system, consisting of a combination of cross-shareholdings by corporations and 
equity investments by institutional investors (Miyajima and Kuroki, 2005). 
However, as far as we are aware of, no detailed empirical investigations have been 
conducted yet regarding the investment behaviour of institutional investors in Japan in terms 
of their ownership of Japanese firms. To this extent, we use a relatively new database, i.e. 
Shareworld, introduced by Thomson Financial in July 2002. We believe that our study is the 
first using the rich potential of this database to analyse the structure of corporate ownership in 
Japan in general and of institutional ownership in particular.  
Specifically, this study aims to address two issues. First, we investigate where the 
institutional investor – both domestic and foreign – situates in Japanese-style corporate 
governance. Second, we assess the relative importance of various types of institutional 
investors – insurance companies, investment firms and pension funds – and provide analysis 
of the variety of their equity holdings in around 3,000 companies listed at the Tokyo and 
Osaka Stock Exchanges. We conduct a comparative analysis, in the sense that this 
investment behaviour of institutional investors is compared with that of another group of 
important large shareholders, i.e. banks. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of corporate governance 
theory and discusses the characteristics of the main corporate governance mechanisms. It presents 
also a detailed description of the conventional system of Japanese corporate governance and its 
recent evolvement. Section 3 first pays attention, following the main literature on the topic, to the 
importance of large shareholders in corporate ownership and corporate control and then focuses on 
the role of a specific group of large shareholders – institutional investors – in corporate governance. 
Furthermore, it discusses the role of institutional investors in Japanese corporate governance. Section 
4 sets out the methodological framework of the empirical analysis and pays attention to some 
descriptive statistics of the dataset. Section 5 presents and analyses the empirical results on the 
equity stakes of institutional investors in our sample of Japanese listed companies. These investments 
are compared with the equity holdings of banks, which have been one of the pillars of corporate 
governance in Japan under the so-called “main bank” system. Section 6 concludes.  
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2 Corporate governance and Japan 
2.1 Agency problems and corporate governance mechanisms 
Given the broad and growing interest in corporate governance issues, it is not surprisingly 
that the topic has been studied from a wide range of angles and following different definitions. 
Generally, US focused studies tend to follow a more narrow view predominantly based on the 
protection of shareholder rights and interests, whereas a broad interpretation is pursued in 
studies oriented towards (Continental) Europe and Japan, which concentrate more on the 
rights and interests of various stakeholders in the firm versus those of the firm itself. 
However, in both interpretations, the existence of potential conflicts of interest – or 
agency problems – between various groups of agents involved in the firm, such as 
shareholders, management and other stakeholders, is the central issue of discussion. 
Schleifer and Vishny (1997), p.737, put the more narrow interpretation of corporate 
governance forward that “… corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”. La Porta et 
al. (2000), p.4, describe corporate governance as “… a set of mechanisms through which 
outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders”. The broader 
stakeholder view is presented for example from a Japanese perspective in Aoki (2001), p.281, 
as “… a set of self-enforceable rules (formal or informal) that regulates the contingent action 
choices of the stakeholders (investors, workers, and managers) in the corporate organisation 
domain”.  
The origin of modern corporate governance theory lies in the seminal work of Berle 
and Means, who raised the issue of the separation of ownership and control in the modern 
corporation (Berle and Means, 1932; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1998). Control is defined in 
terms of the power to exercise discretion over major company decisions, exercised through a 
vote in the shareholder general meetings, which includes the right to choose directors. 
Ownership of the firm is dispersed across a multitude of various categories of shareholders 
(principals), who consequently do not have the ability to control the firm by themselves, or 
shirk this responsibility (“free-rider” problem), and in fact have delegated this control to 
management (agents). It is this loss of power of shareholders, or the separation between 
control and ownership of the firm, which gives rise to agency problems between shareholders 
and management (“principal-agent” theory) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). In general, these agency problems stem from two main sources: 
shareholders and managers may have different goals and preferences, and in addition, they 
may have imperfect information about each others actions, knowledge, and preferences 
(Gillan and Starks, 2000).   
Most studies of corporate governance address these agency problems by 
investigating which specific mechanisms are effective in disciplining management and 
consequently protecting the interests of owners from self-interested actions of management. 
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In general, a number of so-called corporate governance mechanisms are distinguished by 
which shareholders may protect their rights from management’s self-interest driven 
opportunistic behaviour or expropriation (Manne, 1965; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Denis, 
2001; Becht et al., 2003; Gillan and Starks, 2003).   
First, a legal framework may be established which offers owners protection from 
expropriation by management, such as protection of minority rights and provisions against 
managerial self-dealing. Furthermore, incentive-oriented reward mechanisms for management 
may be adopted, which include stock-option schemes and performance based 
compensation systems. Third, managerial labour markets may be promoted in which well-
performing managers are adequately and fairly rewarded, but where under-performing 
management will be penalised. Fourth, an active market for corporate control in the form of 
hostile takeovers is another mechanism to discipline management, which give small 
shareholders both power and protection commensurate with their interest in corporate affairs. 
Moreover, relationship banking, that is monitoring of management and, if needed, intervention 
by banks, called “main bank” system in Japan and Hausbank system in Germany, may be an 
effective corporate governance mechanism. Sixth, mechanisms which increase voting rights 
in excess of cash-flow rights may be used, such as multiple classes of shares, pyramidal 
structures, shareholdings through multiple control chains and cross-shareholdings. Finally, 
shareholdings may not be dispersed but concentrated at large shareholders (concentrated 
ownership) or blockholders, which monitor management and, if needed, intervene to ensure 
that management follows their preferences. An important group of large shareholders are 
institutional investors, which are the central focus of the analysis in this paper and which, from 
a theoretical perspective, will be discussed extensively in section 3.2. 
2.2 Alternative systems of corporate governance: Anglo-Saxon versus 
Continental European and Japanese corporate governance 
It is generally acknowledged that corporate governance mechanisms, although existing in 
basically all developed economies, differ substantially in importance and relevance across 
individual countries. For example, in the US, as formulated by Kang and Shivdasani (1995), 
p.30, “... internal and external governance mechanisms such as equity ownership by top 
executives, monitoring by institutional and large shareholders, outside directors on the board 
and the threat of external takeovers provide incentives for corporate managers to maximise 
shareholder wealth”. However, in other countries, such as Japan and Germany, different 
structures of corporate governance developed, based on country specific legal, corporate, 
historical and cultural characteristics. The investigation of these differences is the central topic 
of the rapidly expanding field of comparative corporate governance studies. 
Generally, conventional wisdom has put the so-called Anglo-Saxon system, 
comprising the US and UK, against the rest of the world, whereby the latter predominantly 
consists of Continental Europe, with a leading role for Germany, Japan and the emerging 
(Asian) economies (Renneboog, 1999; Dore, 2000; Yafeh, 2000; Gugler, 2001; Cernat, 2004). 
The US and UK corporate governance systems are characterised by low concentration of 
ownership and control, in which the size of single shareholdings is rather limited. Voting 
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power is dispersed as well, due to the limited use of vote-enhancing mechanisms such as 
cross-shareholdings. The firms’ goal is to maximise total firm value and therefore to maximise 
shareholders’ equity. In the Anglo-Saxon system, agency problems basically arise between 
owners and management. The “free-rider” problem is of significant importance, as monitoring 
of management by shareholders is not sufficient, and thus the most apparent conflict is the 
possibility of shareholder expropriation by management, leading to significant attention for the 
design of governance mechanisms within the firm that aim at disciplining incumbent 
management. Furthermore, the Anglo-Saxon system is characterised by corporate 
governance exercised via the market in the form of hostile takeovers (“market for corporate 
control”) which discipline management as well.  
By contrast, the traditional description of the corporate governance systems of 
Continental Europe and Japan, in which much more explicit attention is paid to a multitude of 
stakeholders in the firm than in the Anglo-Saxon system, has been one of a relatively high 
concentration of both ownership and control. The concentration of control in the hands of a 
relatively small number of large shareholders ensures that the potential for management to 
pursue its own interests and expropriate the company’s owners is reduced and that, overall, 
agency conflicts between the two parties are subdued. The costs of this system have been 
reduced liquidity and higher risks for large shareholders, due to the concentration of their 
investments in one specific company, a rather underdeveloped market for corporate control 
and the risk for small shareholders that large shareholders can extract private benefits from 
the company. In the exercise of corporate governance, direct control via debt through 
relationship banking has been important and traditionally banks have been one of the pillars of 
corporate governance.  
It needs to be emphasized that the characterization of the various corporate 
governance systems presented here is rather “black-and-white”, a mere random indication of 
generally accepted views. Of course, in different countries specific elements may be, or may 
have been, more or less important, also at different stages in their economic development. 
Furthermore, corporate governance mechanisms do not exist in a steady state, but are 
continuously affected by changing economic, financial and legal environments. As a matter of 
fact, it is currently fiercely debated whether national corporate convergence systems are 
converging towards a more uniform structure or that diversity will endure (Aoki, 2000; Dore, 
2000; Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003). In this respect, empirical research shows that 
globalisation may have induced the adoption of some common corporate governance 
standards, but that there is little evidence that these standards have been implemented and 
that this has not been driven by convergence to US standards (Khanna et al., 2006). 
Moreover, the prevalence of widely held firms in the Anglo-Saxon model is highly exceptional 
from a global perspective, as large corporate sectors in most countries are predominantly 
controlled by very wealthy families (Morck et al., 2005; see also: La Porta et al., 1998 and 
1999). 
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2.3 Characteristics of the Japanese system of corporate governance 
Investigations of the system of corporate governance in Japan traditionally have focused on 
the perceived “uniqueness” of this system in comparison with the corporate governance 
systems existing in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Many studies have argued that in Japan, 
governance mechanisms similar to those present in the US exist to a considerable less extent 
(Prowse, 1992 and 1994; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Morck and Nakamura, 1999a and 
1999b; Van Rixtel, 2002; Anderson and Campbell, 2004). However, according to these 
studies, other institutions for monitoring and disciplining corporate management have been 
identified as existing in Japan, of which the most important ones are corporate groups 
(keiretsu), the “main bank” system and concentrated shareholdings. These mechanisms can 
be described as follows. 
First, an important institution in post-WWII corporate governance in Japan has been 
the large informally organised business group or keiretsu. Most commonly, the definition of 
the financial keiretsu (kinyū keiretsu) is followed, which are also referred to as horizontal or 
intermarket keiretsu (Odagiri, 1991; Morck and Nakamura, 2003). In this sense, each keiretsu 
consists of a number of diversified corporations, clustered around a “main bank” and 
characterised by extensive reciprocal or cross-shareholdings (kabushiki mochiai) and intense 
information sharing among member firms. In these horizontal keiretsu, small individual equity 
stakes of member firms in each other collectively sum to controlling blocks and basically 
ensure a system of stable shareholdings. Managers are monitored by the groups’ firms, 
whereas member firms are monitored by other member firms and the keiretsu’s “main bank”, 
and thereby constituting an important governance mechanism (Berglöf and Perotti, 1994). 
The bank serves as the central organ in the group and plays the leading role in the financial 
activities within the group. In addition to horizontal keiretsu, vertical or industrial keiretsu are 
being distinguished which can be described as industrial groups that encompass the 
suppliers and customers of a single large firm (such as for example Toyota) and which are 
more classically pyramidal structures of inter-corporate equity holdings. During the late 
eighties and early nineties in particular, the keiretsu were heralded both by industrialists and 
academics as being major innovations of how countries could, or even should, organise their 
industrial structures and systems of corporate governance successfully. However, in more 
recent years, less positive interpretations have emerged that questioned the benefits of the 
keiretsu’s involvement in Japanese corporate governance (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1995; Porter 
et al., 2000; Yafeh, 2002; Morck and Nakamura, 2003; Shimotani, 2004). Some evidence of 
detrimental aspects of keiretsu governance relates to the possible existence of entrenchment 
effects resulting from cross-shareholdings: these mutual shareholdings can effectively protect 
the managers of the firms involved from hostile takeovers and proxy contests, especially 
when the total amount of mutual shareholdings by participating firms is high as in Japanese 
large firms in the keiretsu groups (Morck and Nakamura, 1999b). 
Second, regarding the governance of Japanese firms, the conventional view has 
been, as expressed in many studies, that an important role has been played by the so-called 
“main banks” (Sheard, 1989; Aoki and Patrick, 1994; Aoki, 2001). That is, the major 
Japanese private banks have operated informally as delegated monitors – that is also on 
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behalf of other lenders – of large numbers of commercial firms (Diamond, 1984; Krasa and 
Villamil, 1992). Even firms that do not belong to a keiretsu normally maintain an informally 
based relationship with a (large) commercial bank. Basically, the system can be interpreted as a 
more extreme version of relationship banking (Boot and Thakor, 2000). It is alleged that the main 
bank system, particularly during the period of high economic growth that ran from the early 
fifties to the mid-1970s, fulfilled various monitoring functions with respect to Japan’s 
corporate sector (Sheard, 1994; Kaplan and Minton, 1994; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; 
Morck and Nakamura, 1999b). Evidence on the existence and importance of “main bank” 
relationships, particularly on the role of “main banks” in disciplining incumbent management of 
poorly performing firms and in restructuring their operations, has been presented in a large 
number of empirical studies (Hoshi et al., 1990a, 1990b and 1991; Kaplan, 1994; Kaplan and 
Minton, 1994; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995, 1996 and 1997; Kang et al., 2000; Morck et al., 
2000; Nakamura, 2002). However, since the end-1990s, more and more research has 
emerged showing that the Japanese “main bank” system may also have substantial costs, 
such as extracting rents from the “main banks’” client firms, and that concentrated ownership 
by banks does not necessarily lead to better performance of firms (Weinstein and Yafeh, 
1998; Kang and Shivdasani, 1999; Miyajima and Arikawa, 1999; Morck and Nakamura, 
1999b; Kang and Stulz, 2000; Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2001; Becht et al., 2003; Hanazaki 
and Horiuchi, 2003; Morck and Nakamura, 2003; Hanazaki et al., 2004; Luo and Hachiya, 
2005; Miyajima and Kuroki, 2005; Morck and Yeung, 2006).  
Third and finally, control in the Japanese corporate governance structure is said to 
be exercised by major shareholders (i.e. concentration of ownership), with an important role 
for financial institutions. Several studies have documented that Japanese firms with large 
shareholders were more likely to replace managers in response to poor performance than 
firms without them (Kaplan and Minton, 1994; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995). For example, 
increased ownership by blockholders increased the likelihood of management turnover and 
the appointment of outside directors to the board (Kang and Shivdasani, 1997). Empirical 
evidence has also shown that it is important to distinguish between types of large 
shareholders, such as financial versus non-financial or corporate blockholders, and that 
monitoring by the former is more likely than monitoring by the latter (Lichtenberg and 
Pushner, 1994; Pushner, 1995). At the same time, the governance by financial blockholders 
had a positive impact on firm performance compared with a negative effect of monitoring by 
corporate blockholders. 1  All in all, concentrated (intercorporate) shareholdings provided 
Japanese financial institutions with the incentives and the ability to monitor and influence 
managerial performance (Prowse, 1994; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995).  
However, in parallel with the rather dismal performance of the Japanese economy 
during the past decade and important changes in the economic, financial and regulatory 
environment, both national and international, the traditional pillars of Japanese corporate 
governance – keiretsu, “main bank” and concentrated shareholdings – seem to have become 
                                                           
1. Another study finds a positive relationship between corporate blockholdings and firm value (Morck et al., 2000). 
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less relevant. The changing landscape of corporate governance in Japan will be discussed in 
the next section.   
2.4 Recent developments in Japanese corporate governance 
Observers have pointed at major changes in corporate practices that have been taking place 
in Japan in recent years and which have affected fundamentally the main characteristics of 
the Japanese system of corporate governance such as described in the previous section 
(Ahmadjian and Song, 2004; Patrick, 2004; Miyajima, 2005; Miyajima and Kuroki, 2005; Suto 
et al., 2005; Schaede, 2006a and 2006b). These are the erosion of the “main bank” system, 
the significant decrease in cross-shareholdings, in particular the unwinding of these positions 
by banks, and the declining role of the keiretsu.  
All in all, the prolonged economic recession and severe banking crisis in Japan 
revealed very clearly structural deficiencies in Japanese corporate governance practices that 
increasingly are being debated by academics, policymakers and corporate leaders (Morck 
and Nakamura, 1999; Porter et al., 2000; Nakamura, 2002; Yamamura and Streeck, 2003; 
Schulz, 2004; Patrick, 2004; Morck and Yeung, 2006). These developments affected 
corporate governance in Japan in two important ways. First, the economic slowdown and 
banking problems changed the normative framework underlying the system of Japanese 
corporate governance significantly (Milhaupt and West, 2004). Second, they also contributed 
directly to important adjustments of the system of corporate governance in Japan. These 
changes can be summarized as follows. 
First, the practice of cross-shareholdings involving various financial and non-financial 
firms has become less pronounced from the mid-1990s onwards. This process has been led 
by banks: partly because of necessary portfolio-adjustments instigated by risk-return 
considerations and bad loan developments and partly due to regulatory pressures, possibly in 
parallel with the looming introduction of the new Basel Capital Accord (Basel II), Japanese 
banks have reduced their shareholdings rather massively over the past few years (Van Rixtel 
et al., 2004b).2 Overall, it has been shown very clearly that during the past decade, cross-
shareholdings, not only by banks but also by non-financial firms, have been unwinded 
substantially (Baba et al., 2002; Miyajima and Kuroki, 2005; Schaede, 2006a). 
Furthermore, the economic crisis forced many companies to re-organise and 
concentrate on their basic business, which often resulted in cross-keiretsu mergers and 
takeovers, a process in which the banking industry took the lead (see also Shimotani, 2004).3 
As matter of fact, the organisation of the keiretsu conglomerates around large commercial 
banks has been significantly undermined in recent years by a revolutionary merger process in 
the Japanese banking industry involving banks traditionally belonging to various keiretsu, thus 
                                                           
2. One of these regulatory pressures was the introduction of a law that stipulated that banks limited their stockholdings 
to the level of their equity capital by September 2006 (Schulz, 2004; Schaede, 2006a). 
3 . For more detailed analyses of the functioning of the keiretsu and their changing role in Japanese corporate 
governance practices see for example Morck and Nakamura (2003), Douthett, Jr. et al. (2004), Lin (2005) and Wu and Li 
Xu (2005). 
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effectively eliminating the historic barriers between these groups (Van Rixtel et al., 2004a). The 
result has been that the importance of the keiretsu system has been hollowed out, both as an 
important characteristic of Japan’s industrial structure and as a corporate governance 
mechanism. 
Regarding the importance of the “main bank” system, various studies emphasize 
that the processes of financial liberalisation and globalisation, structural changes in the flow of 
funds and the related diversification of the sources of corporate finance have undermined the 
foundation of the “main bank” system (Miyajima, 1998; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001; Aoki, 
2002). Deregulation of interest rates and bond issue requirements resulted in lesser 
opportunities for rent extraction by “main banks” and thus the costs of the “main bank” 
system became significantly higher for the banks involved. In addition, financial globalisation 
and diversification towards market financing gave banks less power. As a result, the role of 
“main banks” in fulfilling in an integrated fashion various monitoring functions has diminished. 
Moreover, the severe banking crisis in Japan and subsequent regulatory forbearance that 
emerged in the early nineties further eroded the effectiveness of the “main bank” system, as 
banks basically stopped operating as “main bank” and recalled loans from troubled borrowers 
(Van Rixtel, 2002). All in all, it is to be expected that the “main bank” system will become less 
significant as a result of the decreasing importance of cross-shareholdings in the Japanese 
economy in general and the reduction of stock-holdings by the major banks in particular, the 
ongoing diversification of the sources of financing of non-financial corporations, the advance 
of new, more market-based lending models in the Japanese banking industry and the 
lingering implementation of the new Basel Capital Accord. The “main bank” system as such 
still seems to be valued by firms, but the role of “main banks” is shifting more towards being a 
resource for knowledge and information, rather than providing long-term financial support in 
their traditional role (Schaede, 2006a; see also: Nakamura, 2002; Vogel, 2006: Morck and 
Yeung, 2006). 
One of the most interesting changes in Japan during recent years related to 
corporate governance has been the growing importance of foreign shareholders. The sense 
of economic and financial crisis functioned as an important catalyst that facilitated the 
participation of foreign investors and companies in the Japanese economic system, which 
has increased significantly in recent years, establishing important equity stakes of foreign 
shareholders in increasing numbers of Japanese companies. As on a number of occasions in 
Japan’s economic and financial history, foreign pressure (gaiatsu) has been instrumental in 
initiating major changes, several observers – examples are Milhaupt and West (2001) and 
Ahmadjian and Robbins (2002) – have expressed the view that increasing foreign ownership 
of Japanese firms could lead to important adjustments in Japanese corporate governance 
practices. 
Another important development for the system of corporate governance in Japan 
has been the development of the market for corporate control, in the sense of takeover 
threats of underperforming corporations. This is reflected in the growing number of domestic 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) which increased from 268 in 1990 to 1,352 in 2003 (see 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA      18    DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 0703 
 
Kruse et al., 2007). This development was partly promoted by the adoption of pro-M&A 
legislation at the end of the 1990s (Higgins and Beckman, 2006). 
Finally, corporate governance practices in Japan also have been affected by 
important changes in the corporate legal framework over the past 10 years, which include the 
permission to establish holding companies and the introduction of stock options in 1997, and 
reforms addressing the basic functioning of corporate boards aiming to improve transparency 
and voting mechanisms and to establish a greater role for independent directors (Milhaupt 
and West, 2001; Ministry of Justice, 2002a and 2002b; Schulz, 2004; Milhaupt, 2005; Vogel, 
2006). These legal changes included several revisions of the Commercial Code, the 
introduction of new bankruptcy legislation and the adoption of a new Corporation Law (Kaisha 
Hō) that shifted significant monitoring powers to shareholders (Van Rixtel, 2002; Schaede, 
2006a; O’Melveny & Myers, 2006).  
To sum up, the ownership structure of Japanese corporations has changed rather 
dramatically during the past 10 years or so and the importance of the traditional pillars of the 
corporate governance system in Japan has been reduced significantly. As has been pointed 
out by some observers, a hybrid system of corporate governance may be gradually emerging 
in Japan that lies somewhere between the Anglo-Saxon model and the “old” Japanese 
system, and that is more a refinement of the traditional model (Patrick, 2004; Hasegawa, 
2005). Within this “refined” system, shareholder activism has been rising, as for example 
evidenced by the establishment of a non-profit corporate reform group “Shareholder 
(Kabunushi) Ombudsman” which has arguably become one of the most important corporate 
law enforcement agents in Japan (Milhaupt, 2003). In this changed environment, an enhanced 
role in corporate governance also may be granted to an important category of large 
shareholders, i.e. institutional investors. We shall discuss the specific role of these agents of 
governance in the next section. 
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3 Corporate ownership: The role of institutional investors in corporate 
governance 
3.1 Corporate ownership, corporate control and large shareholders 
As mentioned in section 2.1, one strategy to overcome the agency problem between owners 
and managers is to concentrate ownership and control in the hands of a few shareholders or 
blockholders. In this view, a high degree of concentration of ownership and control, the latter 
in terms of concentration of voting power, ensures effective monitoring by shareholders of 
management and, if needed, intervention to correct management’s policies (so-called “shared 
benefits” hypothesis). For example, Stiglitz (1985) showed that firms can maximise value 
through the establishment of concentrated ownership of their shares. 
This issue has been discussed extensively in the literature.4 It has been argued that 
the ability of shareholders to monitor management depends on the type, size, and capability 
of a particular shareholding and that each type of shareholding has different monitoring 
abilities (Faccio and Lasfer, 2000; Crespi-Cladera and Renneboog, 2000). Large shareholders 
are believed to have shareholdings large enough to enable them to control or monitor the 
performance of the firm, which is in their own interest (“incentive” effect), and thus they may 
be the solution for the “free-rider” problem, as discussed in section 2.1 (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986; Holderness and Sheehan, 2000; Claessens et al., 2000 and 2002). In this respect, 
attention is paid in the literature to the existence of a positive “alignment” effect that is related 
to concentrated ownership, as increasing the controlling owner’s cash flow rights improves 
the alignment of interests between this owner and the minority owners, and reduces the 
negative effects of the degree of entrenchment created by the controlling owner (Claessens 
and Fan, 2002).  
In addition to its potential benefits, numerous studies have made the point that 
concentrated ownership – i.e. the presence of large shareholders or blockholders – may have 
potential costs as well (Coffee, Jr., 1991; Bolton and Von Thadden, 1998; Maug, 1998; La 
Porta et al., 1999; Holderness and Sheehan, 2000; Claessens et al., 2002; Claessens and 
Fan, 2002; Carlin and Mayer, 2003). First, large shareholders may attempt to expropriate 
private gains at the expense of small shareholders or of other stakeholders such as 
management, employees and other providers of capital such as bondholders. Thus, for 
example, high managerial ownership of the firm may lead to the entrenchment of 
management, as its goal becomes to maximize its own private benefits (“entrenchment” 
effect). This effect could also occur in case of an entrenched controlling owner, such as an 
institutional investor, who may deprive minority shareholders of their rights. Second, related to 
                                                           
4. For excellent literature overviews see: Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Renneboog (1999), Leech (2000), Becht and Mayer 
(2001), Gugler (2001), Bhagat and Jefferis (2002, Becht et al. (2003) and Gillan and Starks (2003). 
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the “entrenchment” effect, the considerable control enjoyed by large shareholders may also 
provide them with intangible benefits, such as status and political influence, which in the 
literature are classified as “private benefits” of control (Morck et al., 2005). The possible 
maximisation of these benefits may be in conflict with the goal of achieving optimal control of 
the firm. Third, large shareholders bear excessive risk on their investments by concentrating 
them in a limited number of companies, although, as has been demonstrated, the existence 
of a liquid stock market reduces the costs of holding large equity stakes (Maug, 1998). Thus, 
there is a trade-off between liquidity and control, i.e. investors that want liquidity of their 
investments may hesitate to accept control of the firms whose shares they posses (Coffee, 
Jr., 1991; Bolton and von Thadden, 1988). Furthermore, when large shareholders exist, small 
shareholders may shirk their monitoring responsibilities even more and engage completely in 
“free-riding” behaviour. 
The effect of ownership structures on the performance or value of the firm in general 
and that of concentrated ownership in particular has been investigated by many, but has not 
yet resulted in clear empirical evidence (Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002). This is to a large extent 
due to the simultaneous presence of both the positive “incentive” and “alignment“ effects and 
the negative “entrenchment” and “private benefits” effects, and related endogeneity problems 
(Claessens and Fan, 2002; Börsch-Supan and Köke, 2002). In general, two opposing views 
on the specific nature of the relationship between the ownership structure of the firm and its 
performance or value exist. On the one hand, various studies present evidence of the 
existence of a relationship between ownership structure and firm value, mostly measured in 
terms of Tobin’s Q (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Boubakri et al., 2005). 
On the other hand, other studies doubt the effectiveness of large shareholders in being 
effective agents of corporate governance. They claim that there is no significant evidence that 
there is a relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance, and that 
owner-controlled firms perform better than management controlled firms (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985; Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 
2001). 
In the next section, we shall discuss an important group of large shareholders, which 
often have concentrated shareholdings, i.e. institutional investors. 
3.2 Corporate governance and the role of institutional investors  
During the past decades, institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance companies 
and mutual funds, have become increasingly important as shareholders: the combined 
financial assets of institutional investors in the major industrialised countries rose from 38% of 
GDP in 1981 to 90% in 1991 and to 144% in 1999 (OECD, 2003; see also Gompers and 
Metrick, 2001). Regarding the specific role played by institutional investors in monitoring the 
performance of firms, or in other words in the operation of corporate governance, different 
hypotheses exist (Romano, 2002; Gillan and Starks, 2003; Parrino et al., 2003). The so-called 
“active monitoring” hypothesis argues that institutional investors have incentives to monitor 
corporate performance, since they will enjoy greater benefits of it than smaller shareholders 
and because through their greater voting power they have the possibility to promote 
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corrective action as well, if needed (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). 
This is in line with the perception that institutional investors are expected to take all necessary 
steps to protect the value of the assets in their possession, including monitoring the 
performance of the firms in which they invest (Monks and Minow, 2001). The opposite view is 
represented by the “passive monitoring” hypothesis, which states that institutional investors 
have rather limited incentives to actively monitor incumbent management, for example 
because of free-riding behaviour of certain institutional investors that could make it difficult to 
take collective action. 
 A large number of empirical studies have been conducted, which try to provide 
answers on the specific role of institutional investors in corporate governance. Some of the 
main ones can be summarised as follows. McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a strong 
positive relationship between the value of the firm and the fraction of shares held by 
institutional investors. Faccio and Lasfer (2000) argue that whether institutional investors are 
likely to monitor as a large shareholder depends on the size of their investment. Davis (2002) 
finds support for shareholder activism: institutional investors, particularly life insurers and 
pension funds, have a disciplining role on management in the Anglo-Saxon countries and 
thus contribute to firm performance. Moreover, this study provides claims that, overall, 
institutional investors have become more active in corporate governance in recent periods. A 
positive effect from institutional ownership on firm performance is also found by Han and Suk 
(1998). These authors find for a sample of US firms that stock returns are positively related to 
ownership by institutional investors, thus implying that these corporate owners are actively 
involved in the monitoring of incumbent management. Crutchley et al. (1999) provide 
evidence for a large sample of US firms that the impact of institutional ownership on corporate 
governance substantially improved from 1987 to 1993 and that in fact it became a substitute 
for internal monitoring devices. Gillan and Starks (2000) find that proposals sponsored by 
institutional investors receive significant amounts of votes and have a small but negative 
impact on stock prices. Furthermore, further evidence of the “active monitoring” hypothesis is 
presented in Parrino et al. (2003), where it is reported that selling by institutional investors has 
a positive effect on management turnover, implicating that corporate boards are sensitive to 
changes in institutional ownership in their firm. Hartzell and Starks (2003) show that 
institutional investors serve as corporate governance agents in mitigating the agency problem 
between shareholders and management, as they find a strong positive relationship between 
the ownership concentration of institutional investors and managerial compensation. Cremers 
and Nair (2005) show that the interaction between shareholder activism on behalf of 
institutional investors and the market for corporate control is important in explaining 
developments in abnormal equity returns and accounting measures of profitability.  
On the other hand, David and Kochhar (1996), who investigate a large number of 
empirical studies on the role of institutional investors in corporate governance, find that the 
evidence regarding their impact on firm behaviour and performance is mixed and that no 
definite conclusions can be drawn. They argue that various institutional obstacles, such as 
barriers stemming from business relationships, the regulatory environment and information 
processing limitations, may prevent institutional investors from effectively exercising their 
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corporate governance function. Coffee, Jr., (1991) explains the historic passivity of institutional 
investors in terms of the trade-off between liquidity and control, but finds evidence that this is 
declining. Leech (2002) is of the view that many institutional shareholders do not seek control 
of a company for a variety of reasons, which include the fear of obtaining price sensitive 
information, and that it is more likely that institutional investors seek only influence rather than 
complete control. Moreover, it has also been argued, in line with the “passive monitoring” 
view, that institutional investors may not be keen to “exit” on their investments (i.e. sell their 
equity stakes when the firm is not performing optimally), mainly because they hold large 
investments and thus selling may lower the price and further increase any potential loss. Also 
Romano (2002) argues, on the basis of an extensive literature review, that despite the general 
favourable assessment of shareholder activism, in particular by institutional investors, 
empirical studies suggest that shareholder proposals have had an insignificant effect on firm 
performance.  
3.3 The role of institutional investors in Japanese corporate governance 
Turning now to the position of institutional investors in the Japanese system of corporate 
governance, traditionally the role of these institutions has been rather minor, reflecting 
unfavourable tax policies and regulatory restrictions on investment behaviour. Moreover, 
institutional investors have had rather limited access to managerial decision-making, as most 
board members usually were selected from company insiders (Sakuma, 2001). In addition, 
shareholders with no credit relations to the firm, such as is mostly the case with Japanese 
institutional investors which generally do not provide corporate financing, have little influence 
on the replacement of board members in times of financial crisis, since bankruptcy laws in 
Japan give preferential treatment to creditors such as banks. From a more practical 
perspective, institutional investors experience difficulties in Japan in performing one of the 
most basic functions of corporate governance, which is attending the annual shareholders’ 
meeting. This because most shareholders’ meetings in Japan take place on the same day, in 
order to undermine the possibility of disturbances at these meetings by specialised criminals 
(so-called sōkaiya). All in all, it can be argued that the traditional behaviour of institutional 
investors in Japan has been in accordance with the “passive monitoring” hypothesis. 
 However, evidence is growing that an important change in the corporate 
governance role of institutional investors may be taking place in Japan, which is a shift from a 
rather passive role to considerably more active engagement. One source of information in 
support of this assertion is information obtained from surveys conducted among institutional 
investors which clearly show that these institutions, gradually but increasingly, are influencing 
the management of Japanese firms towards enhanced transparency and accountability by 
promoting disclosure and communication with shareholders (Suto et al., 2005). For example, 
a 2003 survey conducted by the Japan Securities Investment Advisers Association revealed 
that investment firms had become much more engaged in corporate governance activities. 
Survey data also reveal that certain types of institutional investors, i.e. so-called “trustee” 
organisations like trust banks, life insurance companies and investment advisers, have 
become actively involved in corporate governance activities of Japanese firms, in particular 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 23 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 0703 
 
when compared with other institutional investors such as (corporate) pension funds (Omura et 
al., 2002).  
In addition to survey data, many rather well-informed observers have recently 
pointed at the increasing involvement of institutional investors in corporate governance 
activities in Japan, partly due to regulatory reforms, for example affecting both pension and 
investment funds, and partly due to the apparent failure of the traditional pillars of the 
Japanese corporate governance system (Suto et al., 2005). For example, Becht et al. (2003), 
p.9, assert that Japanese institutional investors are “… becoming more demanding and they 
are one of the forces behind the rapid transformation of the Japanese corporate governance 
system”. In the same vein, Schaede (2006a) asserts that banks are being replaced in their 
role of main corporate “monitors” by institutional investors. Moreover, also Schulz (2004) 
observes that institutional investors are showing a growing interest in the governance of 
Japanese firms. Regarding foreign influence, Learmount and Roberts (2002) describe that at 
the end of the nineties, international institutional investors were becoming increasingly pro-
active in the management of their Japanese share portfolios and started to visit Japanese 
companies (see also: Ahmadjian and Song, 2004). It also needs to be taken into account that 
investment funds and other institutional investors fuelled the rapid development of the market 
for corporate control in Japan, i.e. the boom in M&A activity, and thereby contributed 
significantly to this dimension of the changing nature of Japanese corporate governance 
(Schaede, 2006b). 
Most of these observers have emphasized the importance of the institutional 
investors’ representative organizations in the actual implementation of these institutions’ 
growing involvement in the corporate governance of Japanese firms. As a matter of fact, 
associations of pension funds and securities investment advisers have introduced codes of 
conduct, calling for more active voting policies of their members (OECD, 2003; Japan 
Securities Investment Advisers Association, 2002). The so-called Pension Fund Association, 
which is Japan’s leading pension fund association representing corporate pension funds and 
manages more than yen 12 trillion in assets, has become active at shareholder meetings in 
recent years, often voting against motions put forward by companies’ management. 
Furthermore, it has been reported that the largest public pension funds have formed the 
Council of Public Institutional Investors, which is active in shaping the overall institutional 
environment, including various issues related to corporate governance, and in discussing the 
management of their investment portfolios (Luo, 2007, p.49).  
Finally, during the past few years, a small number of empirical studies have 
addressed the impact of institutional investors on the performance of Japanese firms and 
their involvement with the governance of these firms. The results of these studies, however, 
are not unequivocally clear. Suto et al. (2005), a study based on survey data, finds that the 
fund management of Japanese institutional investors has become more short-term oriented 
recently, due to competitive pressures in the Japanese fund management industry 
predominantly resulting from deregulatory measures. This may be at odds with the enhanced 
involvement of these institutions in corporate governance activities, which by nature has a 
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more long-term orientation. In addition, the results of Seifert et al. (2005) on the impact of 
blockholders and institutional ownership on corporate performance in Japan are rather 
inconclusive. On the other hand, Miyajima and Kuroki (2005) find that shareholdings of both 
domestic and foreign institutional investors have positive and significant effects on firm 
performance in Japan, contrary to those of banks, suggesting the important and positive 
contribution of institutional investors to the governance of Japanese firms. Kim and Nofsinger 
(2005) find evidence of a considerable impact of specific investment behaviour (”herding”) of 
institutional investors on the stock prices of Japanese firms, which shows that institutional 
investors may have an important enforcement mechanism in the context of the 
implementation of corporate governance.  
All in all, it is clear that at this juncture the specific role of institutional investors in the 
current system of corporate governance in Japan and its future development is receiving 
considerable attention, and actually has become one of the most intensely debated issues in 
the Japanese corporate governance debate. However, so far, an important element in this 
discussion has been hardly investigated yet, namely the equity investments of institutional 
investors in Japanese listed firms. The remaining part of our study will be devoted to this 
important aspect.  
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4 Data and methodology  
4.1 Data 
The ownership of institutional investors in terms of their equity stakes in Japanese firms is 
examined using the ownership data of all companies listed on the Tokyo and Osaka Stock 
Exchanges. The data are obtained from the Shareworld database provided by Thomson 
Financial and show the ownership structure at the end of June 2002. A total of 2,938 
companies listed on the Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges are examined in the analysis. 
The companies are classified by both size and industrial sector affiliation.  
The distribution of the Japanese companies in our sample by size and by industry as 
of end-June 2002 is presented in Tables 1 and 2.5 Here, size is defined as a firm’s total 
assets. The size-category that represented the largest number of firms was the one of $25-
<$100 million, constituting around 32% of all firms in the sample. In terms of market 
capitalisation, the category of firms at or above $1 billion in size represented around 75% of 
the total market capitalisation of all listed firms. The total market capitalisation of all firms listed 
on the Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges on 31 June 2002 was $1,245 billion.   
Table 1: Distribution of Japanese listed companies by size (end-June 2002) 
 
Analyzing the firm data by industry affiliation reveals the specialization of the main 
entrepreneurial drivers of the Japanese economic system.  The largest industrial sector listed 
on the Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges by the end of June 2002 was high-tech 
manufacturing. This sector included 867 companies, constituting almost 30% of all listed 
companies, with a market capitalisation of around $335 billion. The second largest group was 
the traditional manufacturing sector representing around 20% of all firms. In terms of market 
capitalisation, communication firms constituted the second largest group of firms, although 
not being the second largest sector in terms of number of firms, with a total market 
                                                           
5. In order to make the description clearer, in the course of the analysis the seven size-categories will be often reduced 
to three, namely small (0-<$10 million), medium ($10-<100 million) and large ($100 million and more) companies (see 
also: Nyman and Silberston, 1978). 
Firm size* Number of firms % of total 
Market 
capitalisation# 
% of total 
$0-<5mln 183 6.23 478 0.04 
$5-<10mln 266 9.05 2,006 0.16 
$10-<25mln 582 19.81 9,879 0.79 
$25-<100mln 936 31.86 47,530 3.82 
$100-<250mln 383 13.04 60,801 4.88 
$250mln-<1bln 372 12.66 188,730 15.16 
≧$1bln  216 7.35 935,281 75.14 
Total 2,938 100 1,244,705 100 
* Firm size is defined as total assets and is in millions/billions of US dollars. 
# Market capitalisation is in millions of US dollars. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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capitalisation of around $260 billion. As a matter of fact, more than 60% of all listed 
companies in Japan belonged to these three sectors. 
Table 2: Distribution of Japanese listed companies by industry affiliation  
(end-June 2002) 
 Number of firms % of total 
Market 
capitalisation* 
% of total 
Business 
services 138 4.7 22,620 1.82 
Communication 111 3.78 260,004 20.89 
Distribution 408 13.89 106,596 8.56 
Financial 120 4.08 82,148 6.60 
High-tech 
manufacturing 867 29.51 334,825 26.90 
Other financial 67 2.28 73,554 5.91 
Resource-based 131 4.46 45,423 3.65 
Traditional 
manufacturing 580 19.74 221,885 17.83 
Transportation 
and public 
services 218 7.42 37,878 3.04 
Utilities and 
construction 298 10.14 59,772 4.80 
Total 2,938 100 1,244,705 100 
* Market capitalisation is in millions of US dollars. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The shareholding ranges of listed companies are presented in Table 3. They provide 
a detailed analysis of the ownership structures of the companies listed on the Tokyo and 
Osaka Stock Exchanges. For example, the category of “<1%” includes all shareholdings of a 
specific investor in a particular firm which represent less than 1% of the outstanding shares of 
that firm. La Porta et al. (1999) suggest that ownership of 10% of a company’s shares 
provides a significant threshold of votes and that usually 20% is assumed to be just large 
enough to give effective control of the firm. The absolute control or the majority shareholding 
is defined as a shareholding of more than 50%. A widely held company is defined as having 
no single shareholder to control the firm. Minority shareholders are those with less than 1% of 
the company’s share capital and large shareholders are those with at least 3% of the shares 
issued by the company. Several studies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996; Faccio and Lasfer, 2000; Gillan and Starks, 2000) use stock exchange declarable 
shareholdings as a cut-off point for large shareholdings. We follow this approach.  
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Table 3:  
Market capitalisation Japanese listed companies according to shareholding ranges  
(end-June 2002) 
Size of shareholdings Market capitalisation* % of total 
<1% 167,853 13.49 
1%-<3% 273,427 21.97 
3%-<5% 267,785 21.51 
5%-<10% 150,925 12.13 
10%-<20% 58,481 4.70 
≧20%  326,234 26.21 
Total 1,244,705 100 
* Market capitalisation is in millions of US dollars. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 3 shows that by the end of June 2002 only around 13.5% worth of total 
market capitalisation of all shareholdings was hold by minority shareholders, while around 
26% of the total market capitalisation of all shareholdings was hold by shareholders who 
owned more than 20% of all shares outstanding. Large shareholders (i.e. shareholders who 
possess more than 3% of the shares outstanding of a particular firm) owned more than 64% 
of the total market capitalisation of the firms listed. This shows clearly the high concentration 
of shareholdings in Japanese companies listed on the Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges.   
In the subsequent analysis, we shall concentrate on shareholdings by institutional 
investors. We define institutional investors here as consisting of insurance companies, 
investment firms and pension funds. Furthermore, they include both domestic and foreign 
institutional investors, according to the country of their origin. For reasons of comparison, we 
also show the shareholdings of banks, which, as we discussed, have fulfilled an important 
part of Japanese corporate governance under the “main bank” system. Thus, our analysis 
allows for making a comparative assessment between the shareholdings of the “new” agents 
of Japanese corporate governance (i.e. institutional investors) and those of the “old” 
governance institutions (i.e. banks). We define institutional investors and banks together as 
financial investors. Table 4 provides an overview of the number of the various institutional 
investors and banks occupying equity stakes in firms listed on the Tokyo and Osaka Stock 
Exchanges. A total of 3,154 institutional investors were registered as having shareholdings in 
Japanese listed firms, of which around 61% was of domestic origin and around 39% was 
foreign. The share of foreign institutional investors is particularly high and is a sign of the 
important position that foreign shareholders have obtained in the ownership structure of 
Japanese firms (see also section 2.4). As a matter of fact, at the end of June 2002, one out of 
three institutional investors holding equity stakes in Japanese listed firms was a foreign 
investment firm.  
Turning to the specific components of the group of institutional investors, in terms of 
numbers pension funds were the largest category, accounting for around 52% of the total, 
while insurance companies were the smallest group at around 7%. Investment firms 
accounted for around 41% of all institutional investors. In terms of nationality, the smallest 
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group of all were foreign pension funds, which comprised less than 1% of all institutional 
investors investing in Japanese firms. The most important group of domestic institutional 
investors were pension funds, which actually represented almost 84% of all Japanese 
institutional investors in our sample. 
Table 4 shows further that the number of banks having shareholdings was 768 as of 
end-June 2002, indicating that there were around four times as many institutional investors as 
banks in the position of shareholder of Japanese listed firms. It is clear that by simply looking 
at the numbers involved, institutional investors represented a very important group of 
shareholders. Furthermore, of the total number of banks having shareholdings, around 60% 
was foreign. Thus, again, we find that foreign ownership is important: of the total number of 
3,932 institutional investors and banks investing in the Japanese firms in our sample, 43% 
had a foreign nationality.  
Table 4:  
Number of financial investors holding equity in Japanese listed companies  
(end-June 2002)* 
Institutional investors 
Number of 
institutions 
% of total % of group total 
Insurance companies 229 7.26 100 
Domestic 69 2.19 30.13 
Foreign 160 5.07 69.87 
Investment firms 1,289 40.87 100 
Domestic 241 7.64 18.70 
Foreign 1,048 33.23 81.30 
Pension funds 1,636 51.87 100 
Domestic 1,621 51.40 99.09 
Foreign 15 0.47 0.91 
Total institutional investors 3,154 100  
Domestic 1,931 61.22  
Foreign 1,223 38.78  
Banks# 768  100 
Domestic 309  40.23 
Foreign 459  59.77 
* Financial investors consist of both institutional investors and banks. 
# The category “banks” includes a small number of other financial institutions which are included by 
Shareworld in the group of banks. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
4.2 Methodology 
Our analysis of the ownership structure of institutional investors and banks in Japanese listed 
companies consists of two parts. First, the frequencies, both of the number of observations 
and of the market capitalisation of financial investors’ shareholdings according to different size 
and industry categories, are analyzed. The frequency of observations refers to the total 
number of shareholdings of the various types of financial investors according to the particular 
size or industry affiliation of the firms in which they invest.6 This approach allows one to 
                                                           
6. Each observation of a shareholding where an institutional investor is owner is counted. 
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observe the investment behaviour and interest of institutional investors and banks in specific 
corporate sectors. In addition, analyzing the market capitalisation of the shareholdings of the 
various financial investors provides information on the financial significance of these 
shareholdings according to firm size and industry affiliation. 
Second, using a method widely applied by other researchers for its simplicity (see for 
example: Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio and Lasfer, 2000; Crespi-
Cladera and Renneboog, 2003), a more detailed analysis of shareholdings in Japanese listed 
companies by different categories of financial investors according to various size and industry 
groups of the firms in which they invest is conducted as well. Empirical evidence is presented 
in the form of descriptive statistics that aims to establish the average level of shareholdings for 
all financial investor categories, and within these categories as well, according to various firm-
size ranges and firm-industry affiliation. Moreover, institutional investors’ and banks’ 
shareholdings are determined following the classification of shareholdings that is used in 
Table 3. Here, we focus on the shareholdings of the financial investor categories under 
different ranges of ownership and, in addition, we measure shareholdings by size and industry 
affiliation within the specific ranges of shareholdings. The aim is to determine the level of 
minority, large and majority shareholdings for each category of financial investors, for listed 
Japanese firms of different size and of different industry affiliations. 
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5 Results and discussion 
5.1 Distribution and share of shareholdings by company size 
The distribution of the total equity capital of the firms listed on the Tokyo and Osaka Stock 
Exchanges by shareholder type is presented in Table 5. This information gives a rough 
indication of the involvement of institutional investors, and of banks as well, in the ownership 
structure of Japanese listed companies. 
Table 5:  
Market capitalisation of shareholdings in Japanese listed companies by shareholder 
type (end-June 2002) 
Shareholder 
Market 
capitalisation* 
% of total 
% of total 
institutional 
investors 
Households 60,762 4.88  
Corporations (non-financial companies) 420,077 33.75  
Banks# 427,294 34.33  
Institutional investors 336,572 27.04 100 
Total 1,244,705 100  
Breakdown institutional investors:    
Insurance companies 154,940 12.45 46.03 
Investment firms 162,459 13.05 48.27 
Pension funds 19,173 1.54 05.70 
* Market capitalisation is in millions of US dollars. 
# The category “banks” includes a small number of other financial institutions which are included by 
Shareworld in the group of banks. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The largest shareholders in Japanese listed companies in terms of market 
capitalisation of their investments were banks and corporations, which both held around 34% 
of the market value of the firms listed on the Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges. They were 
closely followed by the group of institutional investors, which collectively accounted for 
around 27%. The shares of insurance companies and investment firms amounted to 12.5% 
and around 13% of total market capitalisation, respectively, and pension funds had minority 
holdings of only 1.5% of total market capitalisation. The latter finding is rather interesting, 
taking into account the large number of pension funds: although the number of pension funds 
was almost 52% of the total number of institutional investors holding shares in Japanese 
listed firms at the end of June 2002 (see Table 4), the market value of their holdings 
comprised only 5.7% of the market value of the total equity capital held by institutional 
investors. One other notable aspect of the ownership structure of Japanese listed companies 
is the low participation by Japanese households, which owned less than 5% of total market 
capitalisation.  
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Table 6:  
Frequencies of shareholdings by financial investors among size ranges of Japanese 
listed companies (end-June 2002)* 
Size** Banks# 
Insurance 
companies 
Investment 
firms 
Pension funds Total 
$0-<5mln 429 157 103 95 784 
     % of size range total 54.72 20.03 13.14 12.12 100 
     % of owner type total 1.56 1.54 0.26 3.66 0.98 
$5-<10mln  693 242 160 152 1,247 
     % of size range total 55.57 19.41 12.83 12.19 100 
     % of owner type total 2.52 2.38 0.4 5.85 1.56 
$10-<25mln  1,695 590 671 375 3,331 
     % of size range total 50.89 17.71 20.14 11.26 100 
     % of owner type total 6.16 5.79 1.69 14.44 4.16 
$25-<100mln  3,819 1,344 3,083 511 8,757 
     % of size range total 43.61 15.35 35.21 5.84 100 
     % of owner type total 13.87 13.19 7.75 19.68 10.93 
$100-<250mln  2,632 954 3,942 229 7,757 
     % of size range total 33.93 12.3 50.82 2.95 100 
     % of owner type total 9.56 9.36 9.9 8.82 9.68 
$250-<1bln  5,997 2,356 10,130 457 18,940 
     % of size range  total 31.66 12.44 53.48 2.41 100 
     % of owner type  total 21.79 23.12 25.45 17.6 23.64 
≧$1bln 12,263 4,546 21,711 778 39,298 
     % of size range total 31.21 11.57 55.25 1.98 100 
     % of owner type total 44.55 44.62 54.55 29.96 49.05 
Total 27,528 10,189 39,800 2,597 80,114 
     % of size total 34.36 12.72 49.68 3.24 100 
     % of owner total 100 100 100 100 100 
* Financial investors consist of both institutional investors and banks. 
** Firm size is defined as total assets and is in millions/billions of US dollars. 
# The category “banks” includes a small number of other financial institutions which are included by Shareworld in 
the group of banks. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
In Table 6, the frequencies of shareholdings for each type of financial investor are 
presented according to the size ranges of the companies in which they invested. The 
frequencies are the number of times that a shareholding of institutional investors and banks in 
a company of a particular size was recorded. The results show that the frequencies of both 
institutional investors’ and banks’ shareholdings increase as the companies’ size increases. 
As of end-June 2020, the choice of investment of both institutional investors and banks were 
large sized companies: as a matter of fact, around 82%7 of their shareholdings were in large 
companies ($100 million or more in size). By looking at the subgroups of investors, it can be 
seen that more than two thirds of the shareholdings of banks (75.9%), insurance companies 
(77.1%) and investment companies (89.9%), and 56.4% of shareholdings of pension funds’, 
were observed for large companies. The companies with the largest size ($1 billion or more) 
attracted overall the most institutional investors and banks as investors: 54.5% of all 
shareholdings by investment companies and 44.6% of all shareholdings by both banks and 
                                                           
7. For explanation: 82% is calculated as 9.68%+23.64%+49.05%. 
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insurance companies fell in this size range. On the other hand, the frequency of pension 
funds’ investments in the highest range (companies of $1 billion in size or more) was relatively 
low, at only around 30.0%. However, it was still the highest in comparison to the investments 
by pension funds in companies located in the smaller size ranges. In fact, the shareholdings 
of pension funds, in comparison with those of other institutional investors and banks, were 
relatively concentrated in small and medium-sized companies: almost 21% of their 
shareholdings were in companies up to $25 million in size, the largest percentage of all 
institutional investors and banks. 
A notable characteristic of the investment behaviour of institutional investors as a 
group and of banks was their apparent disinterest (with the exception, to some extent, of 
pension funds) in small companies, as their investments in companies of up to $10 million in 
size amounted to only 2.5% of their total investments. In the total frequency of shareholdings 
reported, investment companies dominated with a share of 49.7% of all observations, 
indicating that they had the largest number of shareholdings of all institutional investors and 
banks. They were followed by banks, insurance companies and pension funds, respectively. 
Additional analysis of the investment behaviour of financial investors according to 
nationality of origin is presented in Table 15 of the Appendix, which provides information on 
the shareholdings of both domestic and foreign investors. While more than half (i.e. 58.8%)8 of 
the total shareholdings by domestic financial investors were held in large sized companies, 
foreign financial investors almost entirely (93.2%) held shares in large companies.9 As a matter 
of fact, the majority of shareholdings of foreign institutions fell in the largest size range of 
companies with a size of $1 billion or more. Furthermore, with only 15 observations and 
0.03% of total shareholdings, foreign pension funds were playing a rather insignificant role as 
shareholders of Japanese listed companies. Table 15 also shows that domestic institutional 
investors slightly dominated domestic banks in terms of the total number of observations over 
all company size ranges: the combined number of observations for Japanese insurance 
companies, investment firms and pension funds was 12,666, whereas the similar number for 
Japanese banks was slightly lower at 12,644. Thus, we find another indication of the 
important position of institutional investors as shareholders of Japanese firms, relative to that 
of banks, since their shareholdings allowed them to exercise, to some extent at least, 
corporate governance functions in relation to Japanese listed firms. Finally, it is shown in 
Table 15 that foreign investment firms accounted for 62.7% of all observations of 
shareholdings of foreign institutional investors and banks. This percentage in terms of only 
foreign institutional investors was around 86%, thus indicating that by far foreign investment 
firms were the largest group of foreign investors in terms of the total number (or frequency) of 
shareholdings. 
 
                                                           
8. For explanation: 58.8% is calculated as 22.5%+22.0%+14.3%. 
9. See the last column of Table 15 in the Appendix. 
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Table 7:  
Market capitalisation of shareholdings according to size ranges of Japanese listed 
companies (end-June 2002) 
Size* Banks# 
Insurance 
companies 
Investment 
firms 
Pension funds Total 
$0-<5mln      
     % of size range total 56.45 18.13 11.69 13.74 100 
     % of owner type total 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.1 0.02 
$5-<10mln      
     % of size range total 57.52 20.4 8.81 13.27 100 
     % of owner type total 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.42 0.08 
$10-<25mln      
     % of size range total 56.96 19.54 8.78 14.72 100 
     % of owner type total 0.41 0.39 0.17 2.37 0.4 
$25-<100mln      
     % of size range total 58.59 21.42 11.84 8.15 100 
     % of owner type total 2.64 2.66 1.4 8.17 2.52 
$100-<250mln      
     % of size range total 58.72 20.48 15.01 5.79 100 
     % of owner type total 4.29 4.13 2.88 9.41 4.09 
$250-<1,000mln      
     % of size range total 61.27 19.23 16.79 2.71 100 
     % of owner type total 16.98 14.71 12.23 16.68 15.5 
≧$1,000mln      
     % of size range total 54.64 20.43 22.89 2.04 100 
     % of owner type total 75.58 78.01 83.27 62.85 77.39 
* Firm size is defined as total assets and is in millions/billions of US dollars. 
# The category “banks” includes a small number of other financial institutions which are included by Shareworld in the 
group of banks. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The market capitalisation of the equity stakes held by financial investors (i.e. 
institutional investors and banks) across different firm-size ranges is presented in Table 7. 
Shareholdings in large companies – companies of $100 million or more in size – listed on the 
Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges constituted 97% of the market capitalisation of the total 
equity capital held by institutional investors and banks, with companies over $1 billion in size 
representing 77.4% of the total market capitalisation of these shareholdings. Of the various 
financial investors, banks were majority shareholders, with the market capitalisation of their 
shareholdings in any size of companies on average being 58%. The market capitalisation of 
the shareholdings of pension funds was at the minority level in almost all firm-size ranges, with 
the exception of small and medium-sized companies of up to $25 million in size. In the 
Appendix, Table 16, we show the distribution of the market capitalisation of shareholdings of 
domestic and foreign institutional investors and banks by different size ranges. In line with our 
findings from the analysis of the frequency of observations, domestic banks dominated their 
foreign counterparts in investing in Japanese companies and were overall the largest majority 
shareholders. Japanese banks were followed by domestic insurance companies, which were 
the second largest domestic majority shareholders of firms listed on the Tokyo and Osaka 
Stock Exchanges. At the same time, foreign investment firms dominated other foreign 
investors significantly, especially in larger size companies, and accounted for between 72% 
and 78% of the market capitalisation of shareholdings in firms larger than $10 million in size. 
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All in all, investments in large companies ($100 million or larger) accounted for 98.8% of the 
market capitalisation of all shares held by foreign investors.  
5.2 Distribution and market share of shareholdings by industry sector 
This section of the study carries out a similar analysis as above, being the only difference that 
we now analyse patterns of corporate ownership across industry sectors of the companies 
listed on the Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges. In Table 8, the frequencies of shareholdings 
of institutional investor categories and banks are presented according to the industry affiliation 
of the companies they have invested in. Based on aggregated numbers, around 36% of 
institutional investors’ and banks’ shareholdings were concentrated in high-tech 
manufacturing companies, with the highest percentage of observations (37.0%) recorded for 
investment firms. The second most frequent shareholdings (18.7%) were observed for the 
traditional manufacturing industry. The sector business services was the least favoured sector 
by institutional investors and banks and accounted for only 3.1% of total observations. 
Looking at the investment behaviour of various types of financial investors, it can be 
said that banks held the largest number of investments (i.e. largest frequencies) in the utilities 
and construction sector (37.95%), while investment companies’ observations were 
particularly concentrated in the sector of other financial companies (55.4%). At the same time, 
insurance companies tended to hold shares in the financial sector (18.8%) and pension funds 
preferred the distribution sector. 
The percentages in terms of total market capitalisation of the shareholdings of 
financial investors according to industry affiliation are presented in Table 9. Shareholdings by 
these financial institutions in the high-tech manufacturing sector were the largest in terms of 
market capitalisation (31.5%), followed by the traditional manufacturing sector (21.2%). The 
share of the business services sector, on the other hand, represented the lowest market 
capitalisation (1.64%) of all the shareholdings of institutional investors and banks. Again, 
banks were the most dominant in terms of owning market capitalisation by holding shares 
representing more than 50% of total market capitalisation in almost all industry sectors (the 
only exception being the financial sector). Insurance companies were much more dominant in 
the financial sector by having shareholdings constituting 52% of total market capitalisation of 
all shares held by institutional investors and banks in this sector. At the same time, investment 
firms were represented strongly in the other financial (33.9%) and communication sectors 
(31.1%), while, overall, pension funds owned shareholdings with the lowest market 
capitalisation in all industry sectors. 
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Table 8:  
Frequencies of shareholdings in Japanese listed companies by industry affiliation  
(end-June 2002) 
Industry Banks* 
Insurance 
companies 
Investment 
firms 
Pension funds Total 
Resource-based 1,243 428 1,663 112 3,446 
     % of industry sector total 36.07 12.42 48.26 3.25 100 
     % of owner type total 4.52 4.2 4.18 4.31 4.3 
Traditional manufacturing 5,186 1,997 7,321 453 14,957 
     % of industry sector total 34.67 13.35 48.95 3.03 100 
     % of owner type total 18.84 19.6 18.39 17.44 18.67 
High-tech manufacturing 9,684 3,496 14,727 852 28,759 
     % of industry sector total 33.67 12.16 51.21 2.96 100 
     % of owner type total 35.18 34.31 37 32.81 35.9 
Utilities and construction 2,304 798 2,681 288 6,071 
     % of industry sector total 37.95 13.14 44.16 4.74 100 
     % of owner type total 8.37 7.83 6.74 11.09 7.58 
Distribution 2,651 914 3,636 319 7,520 
     % of industry sector total 35.25 12.15 48.35 4.24 100 
     % of owner type total 9.63 8.97 9.14 12.28 9.39 
Business services 852 266 1,254 97 2,469 
     % of industry sector total 34.51 10.77 50.79 3.93 100 
     % of owner type total 3.1 2.61 3.15 3.74 3.08 
Financial 1,128 622 1,454 112 3,316 
     % of industry sector total 34.02 18.76 43.85 3.38 100 
     % of owner type total 4.1 6.1 3.65 4.31 4.14 
Other financial 1,189 430 2,118 86 3,823 
     % of industry sector total 31.1 11.25 55.4 2.25 100 
     % of owner type total 4.32 4.22 5.32 3.31 4.77 
Communication 1,785 619 3,070 114 5,588 
     % of industry sector total 31.94 11.08 54.94 2.04 100 
     % of owner type total 6.48 6.08 7.71 4.39 6.98 
Transportation and public 
services 1,506 619 1,876 164 4,165 
     % of industry sector total 36.16 14.86 45.04 3.94 100 
     % of owner type total 5.47 6.08 4.71 6.31 5.2 
Total 27,528 10,189 39,800 2597 80,114 
     % of industry total 34.36 12.72 49.68 3.24 100 
     % of owner total 100 100 100 100 100 
* The category “banks” includes a small number of other financial institutions which are included by Shareworld in the 
group of banks. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 9:  
Market capitalisation of shareholdings in Japanese listed companies by industry affiliation 
(end-June 2002, in percentages) 
Industry Banks* 
Insurance 
companies 
Investment 
firms 
Pension funds Total 
Resource-based      
     % of industry sector total 64.24 17.3 15.87 2.58 100 
     % of owner type total 3.54 2.63 2.3 3.17 3.08 
Traditional manufacturing      
     % of industry sector total 60.63 18.91 18.56 1.9 100 
     % of owner type total 22.95 19.76 18.47 16 21.17 
High-tech manufacturing      
     % of industry sector total 55.44 17.75 24.32 2.49 100 
     % of owner type total 31.17 27.54 35.96 31.16 31.45 
Utilities and construction      
     % of industry sector total 61.26 22.65 12.41 3.68 100 
     % of owner type total 6.32 6.45 3.37 8.46 5.77 
Distribution      
     % of industry sector total 56.07 20.85 20.66 2.42 100 
     % of owner type total 7.38 7.57 7.15 7.1 7.36 
Business services      
     % of industry sector total 56.29 13.89 27.27 2.55 100 
     % of owner type total 1.65 1.13 2.1 1.67 1.64 
Financial      
     % of industry sector total 40.45 52.02 5.54 1.99 100 
     % of owner type total 6.67 23.69 2.4 7.31 9.23 
Other financial      
     % of industry sector total 52.95 11.4 33.89 1.76 100 
     % of owner type total 5.88 3.5 9.9 4.35 6.22 
Communication      
     % of industry sector total 57.61 7.51 31.08 3.8 100 
     % of owner type total 11.29 4.06 16.02 16.58 10.97 
Transportation and public services      
     % of industry sector total 56.65 24 15.94 3.41 100 
     % of owner type total 3.14 3.68 2.33 4.21 3.1 
* The category “banks” includes a small number of other financial institutions which are included by Shareworld in the 
group of banks. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
In Table 17 of the Appendix, the distribution of domestic and foreign financial 
investors’ shareholdings according to market capitalisation is presented. The dominance of 
domestic banks over domestic institutional investors is seen even more clearly. The value of 
their shareholdings was on average around 70% of total domestic shareholders’ market 
capitalisation. More specific, the market value of the shareholdings of Japanese banks 
accounted for more than two thirds of the total equity capital held by domestic institutional 
investors and banks in all industrial sectors (with the exception of the financial sector). 
Moreover, domestic banks also surpassed considerably their foreign counterparts in terms of 
market capitalisation of shareholdings. Looking at specific industry sectors, both the domestic 
and foreign financial investors’ shares in total market capitalisation were the highest in the 
high-tech manufacturing sector with 30.2% and 35.4%, respectively. Traditional 
manufacturing was the second most important sector attracting both domestic and foreign 
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investors, with shareholdings in terms of market capitalisation of 21.9% and 18.8%, 
respectively. Foreign investment firms were by far the most important foreign shareholders, 
with absolute majority shareholdings in terms of market capitalisation of above 65% in all 
industry sectors, when compared to the other foreign financial investors investing in Japan. 
Foreign pension funds, once again, had rather limited investments in Japan and did not have 
equity holdings in the resource-based, traditional manufacturing, communication and other 
financial sectors and only small holdings in others. All in all, the distribution of market 
capitalisation across industrial sectors was similar to the ownership structure that we found 
overall in the previous section. 
5.3 Ownership levels of financial investors in Japanese listed companies 
The mean, median, standard deviation and maximum shareholdings of the average 
institutional investor or bank according to the listed companies’ size are presented in Table 
10. When the positions of the average financial investor are calculated, as of end-June 2002, 
the mean shareholdings of the average financial institution that invested in Japanese listed 
companies decreased as the size of the companies in which they held equity stakes 
increased. The size category with the highest mean value was the $5-<$10 million range, 
where an institutional investor or bank on average held 3.01% of the shares of the companies 
in this size category. Pension funds were the exception here; for all other individual investors, 
their investments in the $5-<$10 million range had the highest mean value of all their 
investments. A typical investor owned shareholdings in companies with a size of $1 billion or 
more of on average only 0.18% of the listed firms’ total shares. The total financial investors’ 
mean shareholding, regardless of size ranges, was 0.7% of a firm’s total listed shares, with 
the highest mean value of 3.0% for small companies (i.e. companies in the $5-<$10 million 
range) and the lowest mean value of 0.2% for the largest companies (companies with a size 
of $1 billion or more). Mean shareholdings of pension funds were the highest among all 
(1.85% of the listed firms’ total shares), while investment firms had the lowest mean value of 
shareholdings by possessing on average 0.21% of the shares of all firms listed on the Tokyo 
and Osaka Stock Exchanges (see the last column of Table 10).   
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Table 10:  
Average shareholdings of financial investors according to size ranges* of Japanese listed 
companies (end-June 2002; in percentages)** 
Shareholders 0-<5* 5-<10 10-<25 25-<100 100-<250 250-<1,000 ≧1,000 Total 
Banks#        
mean 3.05 3.08 2.89 2.5 1.92 1.09 0.33 1.22 
median 3.05 2.75 2.66 2.26 1.46 0.04 0.01 0.05 
std. dev. 1.47 3.5 2.35 2.33 2.56 2.69 1.47 2.35 
max 8.49 68.48 58.13 48.07 51 73.9 95.98 95.98 
Insurance companies        
mean 2.76 3.03 2.67 2.47 1.68 0.76 0.29 1.06 
median 2.33 2.41 2.33 2.18 1.25 0.03 0.01 0.03 
std. dev. 1.7 2.17 1.75 1.94 2 1.66 1.02 1.78 
max 9.9 10 10.01 14.15 11.07 33.4 10.02 33.4 
Investment firms        
mean 1.9 2.06 1.19 0.68 0.38 0.19 0.07 0.21 
median 1.37 1.06 0.29 0.18 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.02 
std. dev. 2.06 4.37 2.67 2.22 1.3 0.7 0.4 1.02 
max 11.74 49.54 27.39 86.01 42.05 30.03 29.82 86.01 
Pension funds        
mean 3.29 3.68 3.8 3.11 2.25 0.61 0.16 1.85 
median 3 3.03 3.13 2.57 1.91 0.09 0.03 1.17 
std. dev. 1.96 2.46 2.74 2.24 1.99 1.15 0.43 2.34 
max 9.6 13.45 23.02 20.64 10.17 8.19 3.52 23.02 
Total        
mean 2.87 3.01 2.61 1.89 1.12 0.56 0.18 0.72 
median 2.59 2.57 2.24 1.39 0.18 0.03 0.01 0.03 
std. dev. 1.71 3.32 2.5 2.4 2.06 1.76 0.95 1.81 
max 11.74 68.48 58.13 86.01 51 73.9 95.98 95.98 
* Firm size is defined as total assets and is in millions of US dollars. 
** Financial investors consist of both institutional investors and banks. 
# The category “banks” includes a small number of other financial institutions which are included by Shareworld in the 
group of banks. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Looking in more detail at the various investor categories, pension funds led in all firm 
size ranges up to $250 million by having the highest mean value of shareholdings. On the 
other hand, banks were the largest investor in the last two size ranges ($250mln-<$1bln and 
≧$1bln). The shareholdings of the average investment firm were the smallest in all size 
ranges and the mean of their total shareholdings was just 0.2% of all listed companies’ 
shares. The highest mean value among all average shareholdings of institutional investors and 
banks in Table 10 is that of pension funds’ holdings in companies within the size range of 
$10-<$25 million (3.8%). 
The median values, on the other hand, of the shareholdings of the various financial 
investors were smaller than the mean values for all size ranges of companies. This indicates 
the dominance of smaller shareholdings in a firm held by institutional investors and banks. 
Additionally, the divergence between mean and median values increases as the size of a firm 
increases. The standard deviations show a significant degree of dispersion around the mean 
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holdings, indicating that there was considerable variation in shareholdings. Furthermore, they 
decrease in parallel with the increase in company size. 
The distribution of the average shareholdings by nationality of the various 
shareholders, i.e. both domestic and foreign, is shown in Table 18 of the Appendix. In total, 
Japanese financial investors held on average larger stakes in the equity of Japanese listed 
firms than foreign investors, for all different size categories of Japanese firms listed on the 
Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges. This was the most pronounced for the size category of 
firms with total assets of $1 billion or more: the average domestic institutional investor or bank 
held 0.93% of the shares of companies belonging to this size category, while the average 
foreign institutional investor or bank held only 0.05%. This argument also holds when the 
investment behaviour of the specific groups of domestic institutional investors and domestic 
banks is compared with that of their foreign counterparts, with the exception of pension 
funds. Regarding the latter investor group’s shareholdings, foreign pension funds’ average 
shareholdings were higher than those of domestic pension funds. Turning to the other 
categories of financial investors, domestic banks had the highest average shareholdings at 
2.5% among domestic institutional investors, while the lowest at 0.46% was recorded for 
domestic investment firms. Alternatively, when foreign investors are considered, pension 
funds on average held the largest percentage of shares of all foreign investors in Japanese 
listed firms (1.97%), whereas the lowest percentage (0.07%) was held by foreign insurance 
companies. The investment behaviour of domestic financial investors showed a smaller 
degree of variation between the mean and median shareholdings than that of foreign and total 
shareholders, indicating the dominance of small and minority shareholdings predominantly 
among foreign investors.  
The descriptive statistics of the shareholdings of financial investors in Japanese 
listed companies according to various ownership ranges are presented in Table 11. When the 
frequencies of the observations are counted, 73,016 observations out of a total of 80,114 
were recorded at the minority and small ownership levels of up to 3% of a firm’s stocks. This 
confirms our previous findings about the dominance of small shareholdings. As a matter of 
fact, the number of observations for minority shareholdings (below 1% of ownership) was 
63,873, which accounted for around 80% of all observations. The mean value of these 
holdings was 0.08%, while the median value was 0.01%, indicating that the majority of the 
shareholdings of institutional investors and banks in Japanese listed companies was very 
small indeed and too insignificant for wielding corporate control. Furthermore, shareholdings 
from 3% up to 10% of the listed firm’s shares accounted for 8.6% of total observations, 
whereas the frequency of shareholdings above 10% amounted only to 174 observations. 
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Table 11: Average shareholdings of financial investors according to shareholding ranges  
(end-June 2002)* 
Shareholders <1% 1%-< 3% 3%-<5% 5%-<10% 10%-<20% ≧20% Total 
Banks#       
freq. obs. 17,777 5,096 3,947 620 45 43 27,528 
mean 0.07 2.02 4.07 5.95 12.89 37.23 1.22 
median 0.01 2.03 4.04 5.34 12.17 32.63 0.05 
std. dev. 0.17 0.55 0.65 1.27 2.31 17.57 2.35 
Insurance companies            
freq. obs. 6,866 2,000 884 426 12 1 10,189 
mean 0.06 2.02 3.76 6.62 10.49 33.4 1.06 
median 0.01 2.02 3.62 6.11 10.03 33.4 0.03 
std. dev. 0.17 0.54 0.56 1.45 1.19 - 1.78 
Investment firms             
freq. obs. 37,982 1,307 335 128 37 11 39,800 
mean 0.08 1.73 3.82 6.68 13.59 38.34 0.21 
median 0.02 1.61 3.73 6.31 12.83 30.03 0.02 
std. dev. 0.15 0.55 0.59 1.35 3 18.03 1.02 
Pension funds             
freq. obs. 1,248 740 379 205 23 2 2,597 
mean 0.13 2 3.84 6.72 12.19 21.83 1.85 
median 0.04 1.98 3.77 6.58 11.94 21.83 1.17 
std. dev. 0.21 0.56 0.59 1.39 1.57 1.69 2.34 
Total             
freq. obs. 63,873 9,143 5545 1379 117 57 80,114 
mean 0.08 1.98 3.99 6.34 12.73 36.83 0.72 
median 0.01 1.98 3.93 5.85 11.95 30.03 0.03 
std. dev. 0.16 0.56 0.65 1.4 2.5 17.28 1.81 
* Financial investors consist of both institutional investors and banks. 
# The category “banks” includes a small number of other financial institutions which are included by Shareworld in the group of 
banks. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
According to the total frequency of their shareholdings, investment companies had 
the largest number of investments with 39,800 observations and pension funds the smallest 
with only 2,597 observations. Moreover, 37,982 observations for investment firms (or 95.4% 
of their total number of investments) were located in the ownership range of owning less than 
1% of a firm’s shares. At the other hand, banks registered the highest number of 
observations in almost all ownership ranges, except for the range of below 1%.  
Finally, Table 19 in the Appendix examines similar characteristics of the investment 
behaviour of financial investors regarding Japanese listed firms as Table 11, but than by 
nationality. Of the total number of observations, i.e. the total number of investments by these 
institutions, a majority of 54,804 observations was recorded for foreign institutional investors 
and banks, which was almost 70% of all observations. We found this dominance for all 
categories of investors, with the only exception being pension funds. Thus, overall, this 
finding, based on just the number of investments recorded, is in line with the important 
position of foreign shareholders in Japanese firms, such as described in section 2.4. 
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However, at the same time, it needs to be acknowledged, when the mean and 
median values are taken into account, that a rather low level of average shareholdings was 
observed for foreign institutional investors and banks, with a mean value of only 0.14%, 
compared to a mean value of 1.96% for domestic institutional investors and banks. Therefore, 
on average, domestic investors invested in a smaller number of firms, but, at the same time, 
invested larger amounts of funds than their foreign counterparts. Moreover, the average 
foreign investor preferred to be a minority shareholder (owning less than 1% of a firm’s listed 
shares) in Japanese listed companies, whereas domestic institutions on average revealed a 
preference for the ownership range of 1% to 5%. Domestic banks and insurance companies 
predominantly held equity stakes amounting to 3% to 5% of a company’s outstanding 
shares, whereas domestic investment firms and pension funds preferred to be minority 
shareholders.   
5.4 Ownership pattern of financial groups  
As we discussed in section 2, the large and stable cross-shareholdings between companies 
belonging to the keiretsu groups have been examined rather extensively in the literature. 
However, the shareholdings of the various Japanese financial groups that exist nowadays 
have hardly been investigated at all. This is surprising, because most of these financial groups 
were formed as the result of mergers across the traditional boundaries existing between the 
keiretsu, which eroded the concept of the keiretsu significantly (Van Rixtel et al., 2004a). In 
other words, the establishment of these new financial groups has changed rather profoundly 
the financial services landscape in Japan and thus may have resulted in important changes in 
the structure of corporate ownership. 
 Hence, this section concentrates on the shareholdings of six large Japanese 
financial groups in the firms listed on the Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges: the Mitsui Trust 
Financial Group, Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, Sumitomo Trust and Banking Company, 
Resona Group, UFJ Group and Mizuho Financial Group. 10  We focus on these financial 
groups, because they were represented rather significantly among the institutional investors 
and banks holding shares in the Japanese listed companies in our sample. Furthermore, as 
was observed in the previous section, the majority of the shareholdings of institutional 
investors and banks were too small to exercise corporate control. Thus, it is interesting to 
determine the degree of corporate ownership at the financial group level, because it is 
assumed that with larger holdings in a firm, institutional investors and banks could have 
enhanced capability in exercising corporate governance. We have included the subsidiaries 
and affiliates that fall under the holding companies of the six financial groups mentioned 
before and which were found among the institutional investors and banks in our sample. 
 Table 12 provides an overview of the market capitalisation of the shareholdings of 
the various institutional investors and banks that belong to the six financial groups that we 
                                                           
10. As our analysis is based on data as of end-June 2002, we define the groups as of that moment. For example, in 
October 2005, the Mitsubishi UFJ (MUFJ) Financial Group was created, through the merger of the Mitsubishi Tokyo FG 
and the UFJ Group. 
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take into account. For reference purposes, we have also shown the market value of the 
combined shareholdings of the institutional investors and banks that do not belong to one of 
these groups. It is shown that 45.3% of the total market capitalisation of financial investors’ 
holdings in Japanese listed companies was owned by the six financial groups at the end of 
June 2002. The highest market value (11.2%) owned among the groups was that by 
Mitsubishi Tokyo FG (FG refers to Financial Group in further descriptions), followed by the 
market share of Mizuho FG (10.6%). The market capitalisations of the other four groups were 
less than 10% of the market value of the total investors’ shareholdings with the lowest market 
share of 3.2% recorded for the Resona Group. Among the six financial groups, Mitsubishi 
Tokyo FG and Mizuho FG held together almost half (48.1%) of the total market capitalisation 
of all six groups’ shareholdings. They were followed by UFJ Group (18.9%) and Sumitomo 
Trust and Banking Company (15.7%), whereas the shares of Mitsui Trust FG and Resona 
Group in the six groups’ total were 10.2% and 7.1%, respectively. 
Table 12: Market capitalisation of shareholdings of financial investors* by financial 
group (end-June 2002)** 
Financial groups Market capitalisation 
% of total instit. inv. 
and banks 
% of financial groups’ 
total 
Non-group institutional 
investors and banks 417,663.70 54.67  
Institutional investors 
and banks belonging to 
six financial groups, of 
which: 346,348.80 45.33 100 
- Mitsui Trust FG 35,445.40 4.64 10.23 
- Mitsubishi Tokyo FG 85,453.70 11.18 24.67 
- Sumitomo Trust & 
Banking 54,353.70 7.11 15.69 
- Resona Group 24,574.50 3.22 7.1 
- UFJ Group 65,346.60 8.55 18.87 
- Mizuho FG 81,174.90 10.62 23.44 
Total institutional 
investors and banks 764,012.40 100  
* Financial investors consist of both institutional investors and banks. 
** Market capitalisation is in millions of US dollars. 
 
Table 13 presents more detailed information on the distribution of the market 
capitalisation of the financial groups’ shareholdings according to the size ranges of Japanese 
listed companies. Regarding the combined total of the six financial groups, their 
shareholdings accounted for around half of the market value held by all institutional investors 
and banks in medium and large-sized companies with a market capitalisation of up to $1 
billion. Furthermore, their market share in the shareholdings in the largest companies ($1 
billion or more) was the lowest (44.2%) in comparison to the other size ranges. The market 
shares of financial groups such as Mitsui Trust FG, Sumitomo Trust and Banking Company 
and UFJ Group were relatively evenly distributed among the size ranges. Moreover, as the 
size range of the listed firms increased, actually the market share of Resona Group declined, 
while that of Mitsubishi Tokyo FG increased rather constantly, with the highest percentage 
recorded (11.6%) in the largest size range (≧$1bln). This was actually the highest market 
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share among all financial groups in the largest size category. In all other size ranges, the 
shareholdings of Mizuho FG were the largest in terms of market capitalisation. 
Table 13: Market capitalisation of financial groups’ shareholdings according to size 
ranges (end-June 2002; in percentages)* 
Financial groups 0-<5 5-<10 10-<25 
25-
<100 
100-
<250 
250-
<1,000 
≧1,000 
Mitsui Trust FG 4.68 3.91 3.29 4.14 4.59 4.49 4.7 
Mitsubishi Tokyo FG 6.15 5.8 6.17 7.88 10.71 10.14 11.56 
Sumitomo T & B 8.73 8.31 9.53 8.69 7.77 7.05 7.03 
Resona Group 7.54 6.19 6.59 5.71 5.2 4.41 2.77 
UFJ Group 7.52 7.75 8.09 8.09 9.14 10.06 8.24 
Mizuho FG 10 12.4 14.75 15.57 13.1 12.56 9.92 
Total of groups 44.62 44.35 48.42 50.07 50.52 48.71 44.21 
* As percentage of the total for all institutional investors and banks having shareholdings in Japanese 
listed firms.  
 
Finally, the average shareholdings of the various financial groups in Japanese listed 
companies are presented in Table 14. It is shown that the most frequent observations of 
shareholdings among the financial groups were those of Mizuho FG. Moreover, the mean 
value of these shareholdings (4.2%) was the highest of all groups, indicating the importance 
of this financial group as a shareholder of Japanese listed firms. Mitsubishi Tokyo FG had the 
second highest number of shareholdings, and the remaining observations are rather evenly 
distributed among the other four groups. Besides Mizuho FG, groups such as Mitsubishi 
Tokyo FG, Sumitomo Trust and Banking Company and UFJ Group had on average large 
shareholdings, with mean values of above 3% on average of a firm’s total outstanding shares. 
The smallest mean holding (2.0%) was that of Resona Group. Moreover, the median value 
(1.2%) shows that the majority of shareholdings held by this group was at a low level of 
ownership. Financial institutions belonging to Mitsubishi Tokyo FG held a maximum of 96.3% 
of a firm’s shares, while the lowest value was recorded for Mitsui Trust FG, which had a 
maximum value of shareholdings of only 41.5%. Finally, inspection of the data showed that 
up to nine different financial investors, all belonging to the same financial group, invested in a 
single company. At the same time, a maximum of 31 different institutional investors and 
banks, all belonging to one of the six financial groups, held shares of one particular listed firm. 
Table 14: Average shareholdings of financial groups in Japanese listed companies  
(end-June 2002) 
Financial groups 
Frequency 
(number of 
observations) 
Mean Median Std. dev. Max 
Mitsui Trust FG 2,986 2.78 2.32 2.8 41.46 
Mitsubishi Tokyo 
FG 3,631 3.53 2.81 4.1 96.29 
Sumitomo T & B 2,924 3.64 3.14 3.17 52.04 
Resona Group 3,201 2.04 1.17 2.89 61.46 
UFJ Group 3,067 3.15 2.7 3.32 70.08 
Mizuho FG 4,231 4.15 3.38 3.97 66.46 
Total of groups 20,040 3.27 2.64 3.54 96.29 
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6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigated the investment behaviour of institutional investors in terms of 
their shareholdings in 2,938 companies listed on the Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges at 
the end of June 2002. By doing so, we provide one of the first detailed empirical analyses of 
the involvement of institutional investors in the ownership structure of Japanese listed firms. 
At the same time, we compare this aspect of Japanese corporate governance with the 
shareholdings of banks in the same group of firms.  
Our results show that the equity investments of financial investors – institutional 
investors and banks – in Japanese listed companies at the end of June 2002 were 
predominantly in the high-tech manufacturing, traditional manufacturing and communications 
industries. All financial investors combined held more than 60% of the equity capital of the 
firms listed on the Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges, with banks being the largest group of 
these financial investors. Domestic insurance companies invested heavily in the shares of 
financial companies, which overall increased the importance of the financial sector as a target 
industry for equity investments by financial investors. On the other hand, foreign investment 
firms invested almost exclusively in large companies in Japan. Furthermore, although pension 
funds were the majority investors by number of institutions, the market share of their 
shareholdings on the Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges was very low. Moreover, the mean 
holdings of financial investors in Japanese listed companies were generally small and 
decreased as the market capitalisation of the companies’ shares increased.   
Further analysis showed that on average most of the financial investors’ 
shareholdings in Japanese listed companies were at the minority and small ownership levels 
of up to 3% of a firm’s total stock. This may be due to legal restrictions, as the Anti-Monopoly 
Law restricted the equity stakes of banks and insurance companies in a single firm to a 
maximum of 5% and 10% respectively (Van Rixtel, 2002). The mean shareholdings of 
investment firms tended to be higher in the large shareholding ranges when compared with 
those of other financial investors, while domestic pension funds owned relatively high and 
stable shareholdings of up to the 10% level of ownership in the companies listed on the 
Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges. Domestic financial investors tended to have higher levels 
of ownership than foreign institutions, and small and minority shareholdings were mostly held 
by foreign financial investors.  
 Finally, the average shareholdings of six large Japanese financial groups in Japanese 
listed companies were relatively large, representing an average ownership level of 3.3% of a 
firm’s stock. However, they were not as high as to exert a significant degree of corporate 
control. It is was also observed that the mean shareholding of the financial investors – 
institutional investors and banks – belonging to all six financial groups was 10.1% of a single 
company’s shares, which shows that even the combined equity stakes of Japanese financial 
groups in a specific firm were on average not very large.  
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 All in all, first, we may conclude that as of end-June 2002, banks continued to be 
important shareholders of Japanese listed firms, owing around 34% of the market 
capitalisation of all listed firms on the Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges. Looking only at 
domestic banks, their dominance was particularly significant, as the value of their 
shareholdings was on average around 70% of the total market capitalisation of the 
shareholdings of all domestic financial investors. At the same time, institutional investors, 
predominantly investment firms and insurance companies, were important shareholders as 
well, accounting for around 27% of total market capitalisation. Second, the importance of 
banks was further highlighted by the fact that banks were majority shareholders, with the 
market capitalisation of their shareholdings in any size-range of companies being on average 
58% of the total market capitalisation of all the firms belonging to these size-ranges. In this 
respect, insurance companies were also an important group of shareholders, although the 
market capitalisation of their shareholdings was only around 20% in all firm-size ranges. Third, 
we found that foreign investment funds were very important shareholders of Japanese listed 
firms at the end of June 2002, which confirms the general perception that foreign ownership 
of Japan’s corporate sector has become a rather crucial characteristic of the system of 
corporate governance in Japan.  
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 APPENDIX 
Table 15 Frequencies of shareholdings according to size ranges of Japanese listed companies (end-June 2002) 
Size* Banks# Insurance companies Investment firms Pension funds Total 
 Total Domestic Foreign Total Domestic Foreign Total Domestic Foreign Total Domestic Foreign Total Domestic Foreign 
0-<5 429 416 13 157 152 5 103 66 37 95 95 0 784 729 55 
     % of size range total 54.7 57.1 23.6 20.0 20.9 9.1 13.1 9.1 67.3 12.1 13.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
     % of owner type total 1.6 3.3 0.1 1.5 3.3 0.1 0.3 1.2 0.1 3.7 3.7 0.0 1.0 2.9 0.1 
5-<10 693 667 26 242 237 5 160 74 86 152 151 1 1,247 1,129 118 
     % of size range total 55.6 59.1 22.0 19.4 21.0 4.2 12.8 6.6 72.9 12.2 13.4 0.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 
     % of owner type total 2.5 5.3 0.2 2.4 5.1 0.1 0.4 1.4 0.3 5.9 5.9 6.7 1.6 4.5 0.2 
10-<25 1,695 1,626 69 590 560 30 671 198 473 375 373 2 3,331 2,757 574 
     % of size range total 50.9 59.0 12.0 17.7 20.3 5.2 20.1 7.2 82.4 11.3 13.5 0.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 
     % of owner type total 6.2 12.9 0.5 5.8 12.1 0.5 1.7 3.6 1.4 14.4 14.5 13.3 4.2 10.9 1.1 
25-<100 3,819 3,462 357 1,344 1,150 194 3,083 700 2,383 511 507 4 8,757 5,819 2,938 
     % of size range total 43.6 59.5 12.2 15.4 19.8 6.6 35.2 12.0 81.1 5.8 8.7 0.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 
     % of owner type total 13.9 27.4 2.4 13.2 24.8 3.5 7.8 12.8 6.9 19.7 19.6 26.7 10.9 23.0 5.4 
100-<250 2,632 1,978 654 954 606 348 3,942 815 3,127 229 226 3 7,757 3,625 4,132 
     % of size range total 33.9 54.6 15.8 12.3 16.7 8.4 50.8 22.5 75.7 3.0 6.2 0.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 
     % of owner type total 9.6 15.6 4.4 9.4 13.1 6.3 9.9 15.0 9.1 8.8 8.8 20.0 9.7 14.3 7.5 
250-<1,000 5,997 2,569 3,428 2,356 871 1,485 10,130 1,660 8,470 457 456 1 18,940 5,556 13,384 
     % of size range total 31.7 46.2 25.6 12.4 15.7 11.1 53.5 29.9 63.3 2.4 8.2 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
     % of owner type total 21.8 20.3 23.0 23.1 18.8 26.7 25.5 30.4 24.7 17.6 17.7 6.7 23.6 22.0 24.4 
≧1,000 12,263 1,926 10,337 4,546 1,055 3,491 21,711 1,940 19,771 778 774 4 39,298 5,695 33,603 
     % of size range total 31.2 33.8 30.8 11.6 18.5 10.4 55.3 34.1 58.8 2.0 13.6 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
     % of owner type total 44.6 15.2 69.5 44.6 22.8 62.8 54.6 35.6 57.6 30.0 30.0 26.7 49.1 22.5 61.3 
Total 27,528 12,644 14,884 10,189 4,631 5,558 39,800 5,453 34,347 2,597 2,582 15 80,114 25,310 54,804 
     % to size total 34.4 50.0 27.2 12.7 18.3 10.1 49.7 21.5 62.7 3.2 10.2 0.03 100.0 100.0 100.0 
     % to owner total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
* Firm size is defined as total assets and is in millions of US dollars. 
# The category “banks” includes a small number of other financial institutions which are included by Shareworld in the group of banks. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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Table 16 Market capitalisation of shareholdings according to size ranges of Japanese listed companies (end-June 2002) 
Size* Banks# Insurance companies Investment firms Pension funds Total 
 Total Domestic Foreign Total Domestic Foreign Total Domestic Foreign Total Domestic Foreign Total Domestic Foreign 
0-<5                
% of size range total 56.5 57.4 37.4 18.1 18.6 8.7 11.7 9.6 53.9 13.7 14.4 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
% of owner type total 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
5-<10                
% of size range total 57.5 57.8 52.0 20.4 21.5 1.4 8.8 6.6 45.8 13.3 14.0 0.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 
% of owner type total 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 
10-<25                
% of size range total 57.0 59.1 22.9 19.5 20.5 4.3 8.8 4.8 71.8 14.7 15.6 1.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
% of owner type total 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.1 2.4 2.4 2.5 0.4 0.5 0.1 
25-<100                
% of size range total 58.6 63.7 14.8 21.4 23.1 6.9 11.8 4.1 77.9 8.2 9.1 0.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 
% of owner type total 2.6 2.8 0.9 2.7 2.7 1.8 1.4 3.4 1.1 8.2 8.2 12.4 2.5 3.0 1.1 
100-<250                
% of size range total 58.7 66.0 16.6 20.5 23.3 4.3 15.0 4.2 77.9 5.8 6.6 1.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 
% of owner type total 4.3 4.5 2.3 4.1 4.2 2.6 2.9 5.3 2.5 9.4 9.2 74.3 4.1 4.6 2.5 
250-<1,000                
% of size range total 61.3 70.0 21.5 19.2 22.5 4.6 16.8 4.3 73.9 2.7 3.3 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
% of owner type total 17.0 17.2 13.9 14.7 14.8 12.8 12.2 19.8 11.1 16.7 16.7 6.7 15.5 16.7 11.7 
≧1,000                
% of size range total 54.6 67.7 17.8 20.4 26.2 4.1 22.9 3.4 78.1 2.0 2.8 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
% of owner type total 75.6 75.0 82.7 78.0 77.8 82.7 83.3 70.6 85.1 62.9 63.1 3.7 77.4 75.1 84.6 
* Firm size is defined as total assets and is in millions of US dollars. 
# The category “banks” includes a small number of other financial institutions which are included by Shareworld in the group of banks. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
B
A
N
C
O
 D
E
 E
S
P
A
Ñ
A      52    D
O
C
U
M
E
N
T
O
 O
C
A
S
IO
N
A
L N
.º 0703 
 
 Table 17 Market capitalisation of shareholdings by financial investors according to industry affiliation of Japanese listed companies (end-June 2002)* 
Banks# Insurance companies Investment firms Pension funds Total Industry 
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign 
Resource-based           
% of industry sector total 72.88 31.05 20.74 4.09 3.13 64.86 3.26 0 100 100 
% of owner type total 3.45 4.56 2.63 2.6 2.8 2.23 3.18 0 3.21 2.66 
Traditional manufacturing           
% of industry sector total 72.31 17.1 22.84 4.26 2.44 78.63 2.41 0 100 100 
% of owner type total 23.39 17.68 19.8 19.01 14.93 18.99 16.06 1.6 21.93 18.75 
High-tech manufacturing           
     % of industry sector total 68.71 19.37 22.98 3.52 4.9 77.08 3.4 0.03 100 100 
     % of owner type total 30.61 37.83 27.43 29.67 41.28 35.17 31.19 23.3 30.21 35.42 
Utilities and construction           
     % of industry sector total 67.99 23.44 25.62 5.95 2.05 70.6 4.34 0.02 100 100 
     % of owner type total 6.45 4.72 6.52 5.17 3.68 3.32 8.48 1.51 6.44 3.65 
Distribution           
     % of industry sector total 67.28 16.98 25.66 4.07 4.05 78.57 3.01 0.37 100 100 
     % of owner type total 7.46 6.43 7.62 6.65 8.48 6.95 6.88 64.07 7.52 6.87 
Business services           
     % of industry sector total 73.51 15.9 17.93 4.42 4.96 79.57 3.59 0.11 100 100 
     % of owner type total 1.64 1.8 1.07 2.16 2.09 2.11 1.65 5.67 1.51 2.06 
Financial           
     % of industry sector total 42.02 20.8 55.21 12.2 0.62 66.99 2.15 0.01 100 100 
     % of owner type total 6.96 3.28 24.49 8.32 1.93 2.47 7.34 0.38 11.23 2.86 
Other financial           
     % of industry sector total 73.72 12.21 14.79 4.75 8.83 83.05 2.65 0 100 100 
     % of owner type total 5.88 5.91 3.16 9.93 13.31 9.4 4.36 0.29 5.41 8.79 
Communication           
     % of industry sector total 81.06 16.49 9.81 3.46 3.15 80.05 5.97 0 100 100 
     % of owner type total 10.97 15.15 3.56 13.73 8.06 17.19 16.64 1.53 9.17 16.67 
Transportation and public 
services           
     % of industry sector total 64.2 21.11 28.01 5.08 3.66 73.78 4.13 0.03 100 100 
     % of owner type total 3.19 2.65 3.72 2.75 3.43 2.16 4.22 1.65 3.36 2.28 
* Market capitalisation is in millions of US dollars; financial investors consist of both institutional investors and banks. 
# The category “banks” includes a small number of other financial institutions which are included by Shareworld in the group of banks.  
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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Table 18 Average shareholdings of domestic and foreign financial investors according to size ranges of Japanese listed companies (end-June 2002) 
Size* 0-<5mln 5-<10 10-<25 25-<100 100-<250 250-<1,000 ≧1,000 Total 
 Shareholder Dom. For. Dom. For. Dom. For. Dom. For. Dom. For. Dom. For. Dom. For. Dom. For. 
Banks#                
mean 3.06 2.57 2.98 5.44 2.93 1.87 2.69 0.73 2.43 0.36 2.39 0.12 1.91 0.03 2.53 0.10 
median 3.05 1.99 2.83 1.45 2.75 0.59 2.41 0.12 2.25 0.04 2.07 0.01 1.60 0.01 2.30 0.01 
standard deviation 1.46 1.95 2.30 13.87 2.19 4.75 2.29 1.92 2.36 2.51 3.35 1.44 3.20 0.32 2.68 1.19 
max 8.49 5.48 49.28 68.48 58.13 37.81 48.07 22.49 37.47 51.00 70.08 73.90 95.98 29.79 95.98 73.90 
Insurance companies                 
mean 2.77 2.37 3.08 0.77 2.77 0.84 2.79 0.60 2.56 0.15 1.95 0.06 1.20 0.02 2.25 0.07 
median 2.30 2.59 2.45 0.18 2.42 0.30 2.37 0.12 2.16 0.04 1.71 0.01 0.01 0.01 2.00 0.01 
standard deviation 1.72 0.95 2.16 1.04 1.72 1.18 1.84 1.41 2.01 0.45 2.25 0.29 1.84 0.08 2.05 0.37 
max 9.90 3.02 10.00 2.50 10.01 5.00 14.15 9.88 11.07 5.47 33.40 7.89 10.02 3.71 33.40 9.88 
Investment firms                 
mean 2.17 1.42 3.38 0.93 2.26 0.75 0.93 0.60 0.46 0.36 0.25 0.18 0.12 0.07 0.46 0.17 
median 1.47 0.82 2.01 0.39 0.87 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 
standard deviation 2.10 1.93 6.04 1.26 3.75 1.89 2.08 2.25 1.86 1.11 0.76 0.69 0.64 0.37 1.67 0.86 
max 11.74 10.24 49.54 6.96 23.59 27.39 26.92 86.01 37.98 42.05 9.39 30.03 13.74 29.82 49.54 86.01 
Pension funds                 
mean 3.29 0.00 3.68 3.51 3.81 2.99 3.13 1.59 2.22 3.97 0.61 1.03 0.16 0.00 1.85 1.92 
median 3.00 0.00 3.00 3.51 3.13 2.99 2.59 1.47 1.91 1.34 0.09 1.03 0.03 0.00 1.16 1.25 
standard deviation 1.96 0.00 2.47 0.00 2.74 2.42 2.24 0.83 1.94 4.85 1.15 0.00 0.43 0.00 2.34 2.51 
max 9.60 0.00 13.45 3.51 23.02 4.70 20.64 2.69 10.17 9.57 8.19 1.03 3.52 0.00 23.02 9.57 
Total                 
mean 2.95 1.78 3.12 1.94 2.97 0.90 2.53 0.62 2.00 0.34 1.54 0.15 0.93 0.05 1.96 0.14 
median 2.70 1.34 2.71 0.53 2.62 0.23 2.23 0.17 1.62 0.06 0.31 0.02 0.05 0.01 1.55 0.01 
standard deviation 1.67 1.91 2.70 6.77 2.36 2.42 2.26 2.16 2.33 1.40 2.68 0.92 2.21 0.33 2.49 0.93 
max 11.74 10.24 49.54 68.48 58.13 37.81 48.07 86.01 37.98 51.00 70.08 73.90 95.98 29.82 95.98 86.01 
* Firm size is defined as market capitalisation and is in millions of US dollars; financial investors consist of both institutional investors and banks. 
# The category “banks” includes a small number of other financial institutions which are included by Shareworld in the group of banks. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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 Table 19 Average shareholdings of domestic and foreign financial investors by ownership range (end-June 2002)* 
<1% 1%-<3% 3%-<5% 5%-<10% 10%-<20% ≧20% Total 
Shareholder 
Dom. For. Dom. For. Dom. For. Dom. For. Dom. For. Dom. For. Dom. For. 
Banks# 
freq. obs. 3,117 14,660 4,955 141 3,893 54 608 12 39 6 32 11 12,644 14,884 
mean 0.24 0.03 2.03 1.88 4.07 4.08 5.96 5.52 13.07 11.73 37.39 36.76 2.53 0.1 
median 0.04 0.01 2.04 1.84 4.04 4.08 5.34 5.32 12.24 11.88 32.8 29.79 2.3 0.01 
standard deviation 0.32 0.08 0.55 0.55 0.65 0.62 1.28 0.84 2.38 1.44 17.24 19.37 2.68 1.19 
Insurance companies  
freq. obs. 1,374 5,492 1,952 48 874 10 418 8 12 - 1 - 4,631 5,558 
mean 0.19 0.03 2.02 1.79 3.76 3.46 6.6 7.28 10.49 - 33.4 - 2.25 0.07 
median 0.02 0.01 2.03 1.76 3.62 3.38 6.11 6.92 10.03 - 33.4 - 2 0.01 
standard deviation 0.3 0.08 0.54 0.61 0.56 0.48 1.43 2.07 1.19 - - - 2.05 0.37 
Investment firms 
freq. obs. 4,919 33,063 350 957 90 245 62 66 28 9 4 7 5,453 34,347 
mean 0.12 0.07 1.73 1.74 3.89 3.79 6.96 6.43 13.41 14.15 34.51 40.53 0.46 0.17 
median 0.04 0.01 1.57 1.62 3.88 3.67 6.85 5.99 12.72 14.79 32.45 30.03 0.05 0.02 
standard deviation 0.19 0.15 0.57 0.54 0.63 0.58 1.36 1.3 3.01 3.05 11.76 21.39 1.67 0.86 
Pension funds 
freq. obs. 1,243 5 733 7 377 2 204 1 23 - 2 - 2,582 15 
mean 0.13 0.15 2.01 1.47 3.84 4.1 6.71 9.57 12.19 - 21.83 - 1.85 1.92 
median 0.04 0 1.99 1.28 3.77 4.1 6.57 9.57 11.94 - 21.83 - 1.16 1.25 
standard deviation 0.21 0.33 0.56 0.59 0.59 0.84 1.38 - 1.57 - 1.69 - 2.34 2.51 
Total  
freq. obs. 10,653 53,220 7,990 1,153 5234 311 1292 87 102 15 39 18 25,310 54,804 
mean 0.17 0.06 2.01 1.75 4 3.83 6.33 6.42 12.66 13.18 36.19 38.22 1.96 0.14 
median 0.04 0.01 2.01 1.65 3.94 3.74 5.85 5.88 11.94 12.53 32.63 29.92 1.55 0.01 
standard deviation 0.26 0.13 0.55 0.55 0.65 0.59 1.4 1.42 2.47 2.75 16.31 19.64 2.49 0.93 
* Financial investors consist of both institutional investors and banks. 
# The category “banks” includes a small number of other financial institutions which are included by Shareworld in the group of banks. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
 
B
A
N
C
O
 D
E
 E
S
P
A
Ñ
A      55    D
O
C
U
M
E
N
T
O
 O
C
A
S
IO
N
A
L N
.º 0703 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS  
0501 JOSÉ RAMÓN MARTÍNEZ-RESANO: Size and heterogeneity matter. A microstructure-based analysis of 
regulation of secondary markets for government bonds. 
0502 ALICIA GARCÍA-HERRERO, SERGIO GAVILÁ AND DANIEL SANTABÁRBARA: China’s banking reform: an 
assessment of its evolution and possible impact. 
0503 ANA BUISÁN, DAVID LEARMONTH AND MARÍA SEBASTIÁ BARRIEL: An industry approach to understanding 
export performance: stylised facts and empirical estimation. 
0504 ANA BUISÁN AND FERNANDO RESTOY: Cross-country macroeconometric heterogeneity in EMU. 
0505 JOSÉ LUIS MALO DE MOLINA: Una larga fase de expansión de la economía española. 
0506 VICTOR GARCÍA-VAQUERO AND JORGE MARTÍNEZ: Fiscalidad de la vivienda en España. 
0507 JAIME CARUANA: Monetary policy, financial stability and asset prices. 
0601 JUAN F. JIMENO, JUAN A. ROJAS AND SERGIO PUENTE: Modelling the impact of aging on Social Security 
expenditures. 
0602 PABLO MARTÍN-ACEÑA: La Banque de France, la BRI et la création du Service des Études de la Banque 
d’Espagne au début des années 1930. (There is a Spanish version of this edition with the same number.) 
0603 CRISTINA BARCELÓ: Imputation of the 2002 wave of the Spanish Survey of Household Finances (EFF). 
0604 RAFAEL GÓMEZ AND PABLO HERNÁNDEZ DE COS: The importance of being mature: The effect of 
demographic maturation on global per-capita income. 
0605 JUAN RUIZ AND JOSEP VILARRUBIA: International recycling of petrodolars. (The original Spanish version has 
the same number.) 
0606 ALICIA GARCÍA-HERRERO AND SERGIO GAVILÁ: Posible impacto de Basilea II en los países emergentes. 
0607 ESTHER GORDO, JAVIER JAREÑO AND ALBERTO URTASUN: Radiografía del sector de servicios en España.  
0608 JUAN AYUSO, ROBERTO BLANCO AND FERNANDO RESTOY: House prices and real interest rates in Spain. 
0701 JOSÉ LUIS MALO DE MOLINA: Los principales rasgos y experiencias de la integración de la economía española 
en la UEM. 
0702 ISABEL ARGIMÓN, FRANCISCO DE CASTRO AND ÁNGEL LUIS GÓMEZ: Una simulación de los efectos de la 
reforma del IRPF sobre la carga impositiva. 
0703 YENER ALTUNBAŞ, ALPER KARA AND ADRIAN VAN RIXTEL: Corporate governance and corporate ownership: 
The investment behaviour of Japanese institutional investors. 
 
Unidad de Publicaciones
Alcalá, 522; 28027 Madrid
Telephone +34 91 338 6363. Fax +34 91 338 6488
e-mail: publicaciones@bde.es
www.bde.es
 
